Analysis of the Ukrainian Security Policy at the End of 2006: Taking Stock
This report was prepared under the “Public Awareness Campaign on Security and Defense Policy” project, implemented by the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, Ukraine, with the support of the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine and the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv.

This report is based on analysis carried out by ICPS specialists, consultations with participants in public seminars in early 2006, and a high-profile public conference called “Intensified Ukraine–NATO Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits of Accession to the Membership Action Plan” that took place in Kyiv on 13 October 2006.

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The authors would like to thank all organizations that provided support in organizing public debates and preparing this report.

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The electronic version of this publication can be found at the ICPS website at http://www.icps.com.ua/eng

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Introduction

On the surface, 2006 has seen major changes to the way defense and security issues are approached by both the government and the public. This is primarily because of the high level of attention that has been devoted to the topic of NATO membership, which has become the subject of a bitter political struggle. When Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych announced in September that Ukraine would not be seeking a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Riga Summit in November 2006, this seemed to emphasize the fact that the new government had a different approach to defense, security and foreign policy issues.

In itself, however, this announcement was less significant than it seems. Yanukovych has not entirely ruled out developing a MAP (or joining the alliance) at some point in the future, nor has the government reduced its current levels of cooperation with NATO. Taken as a whole, however, the debate about NATO membership in 2006 has revealed that the underlying problems in Ukraine’s security and defense policy have largely gone unchanged and are as far from being resolved as ever. The topic of NATO membership is usually discussed in isolation from the security threats and reform challenges that Ukraine must address. It is therefore unclear whether cooperation/integration with NATO would be beneficial or not. This is a problem for supporters of NATO membership, but it is a much wider problem for Ukraine as a whole. Without a clear understanding of the challenges the country faces in the security and defense spheres, and a transparent debate on how to deal with them, how can Ukrainians be sure that they have adequate mechanisms to respond to these problems?

The aim of this paper is to redirect attention away from the controversial issue of NATO membership towards these underlying issues, which have not generally been the topic of public discussions. It asks numerous questions about Ukraine’s security and defense policies, such as: What are the biggest threats to Ukraine’s security and how should the country best deal with them? What kind of reforms are needed to make the Ukrainian security sector more efficient? How are the Armed Forces being modernized and what will this mean for their effectiveness? Is sufficient money being spent on defense and is it being spent effectively? Where does Ukraine stand in terms of practical cooperation with NATO? And why have Ukraine’s much-discussed “public information campaigns” about NATO been so ineffective thus far?

The paper is thus a stock-take of the situation in the Ukrainian security sector at the end of 2006. It is hoped that such an approach will help to generate further discussion on these issues and will improve the quality of dialogue on defense and security issues. If we are to go beyond the current deadlock, we must ask the right questions, answer them in as balanced and well-thought-out manner as possible, consider other people’s answers to the same questions and then decide how best
to proceed. Where possible, the paper attempts to answer the questions it raises, but this is not always possible within the scope of the current project. Thus the report also suggests areas in which further research would be appropriate.

This research is aimed at a variety of actors, including government officials working directly on defense and security issues, the politicians who must define Ukraine’s future defense and security policies, the media who must explain the issues to the public and the general public directly. The final goal is to increase the level of public knowledge of such matters and improve the quality of future policy making and implementation.

This paper was funded by the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands in Ukraine as part of a project on “Public Awareness Raising of Government Policy on Security and Defense Matters,” which was also funded by the NATO Documentation Center in Kyiv. Parts of this paper were presented for discussion during public consultation seminars in early 2006 and at a high-level public conference entitled “Intensified Ukraine—NATO Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits of Accession to the Membership Action Plan,” held in Kyiv on 13 October 2006.

The paper is structured in three sections: Section 1 contains a discussion paper that aims to identify a broad range of questions relating to security and defense policy that require further consideration. As Section 1 shows, it is a debate that has been catalyzed by the controversy over NATO membership, but it has much wider implications. Section 2 analyses four areas that are crucial to defense and security in any country: national security and threat perceptions; the organization of the security sector and the security sector reform; structural reform of the Armed Forces; and defense and security expenditure. Section 3 then considers the evolution of NATO–Ukraine cooperation, and how this has affected the development of Ukraine’s security architecture. It also attempts to answer one of the most fundamental questions about how the NATO–Ukraine relationship is perceived within Ukraine: why have public information campaigns been ineffective thus far? Further information about the conference on 13 October 2006 is presented in Appendix 1.

The report was written by ICPS experts Duncan Hiscock, Oleh Myroshnichenko and Natalya Shapovalova. Significant contributions also came from Viktor Chumak, Denis Trifonov and Natalya Starostenko. ICPS is also grateful for the ideas and feedback received from the participants in the public consultations and the international conference at which the contents of this research were discussed.
Section 1

Opening the debate
Ukraine–NATO relations—clarifying the present and deciding the future

Introduction: The need for clarity

Three key events have taken place in Ukraine relating to NATO in 2006:

1) Protests in Feodosia against the arrival of the USS Endeavor in preparation for the US–Ukraine annual Sea Breeze naval exercises escalated into anti-NATO protests that gained great political resonance.
2) The parties that make up the “anti-crisis coalition” and the president agreed that a referendum should be held to decide whether Ukraine should join NATO; this commitment was enshrined in the Charter of National Unity (the Universal).
3) In September 2006, during a visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych publicly stated that Ukraine would not be seeking to join the Membership Action Plan at the Riga Summit in November 2006.

Thanks to these high-profile events, NATO is a regular topic of conversation both among the political elite and the general public. The only two clear conclusions that can be drawn from these conversations are that:

- The public mood is increasingly hostile towards the idea of Ukrainian membership of NATO, as opinion polls demonstrate;
- No consensus exists within the Ukrainian elite about what speed and depth of integration into NATO is desirable.

Beyond that, however, little clarity exists. Many important questions about Ukraine’s place in the world and how it provides for its security have been lost behind simplistic “for” or “against” arguments about eventual NATO membership. Both supporters and opponents of NATO membership have expended much of their energy criticizing their opponents and their arguments. Much less effort has been put on considering how to move the debate forward. As a result, discussions about NATO in Ukraine are in danger of becoming very circular and repetitive.

ICPS believes that in order to get beyond this current impasse, two key things are needed: rational, unbiased analysis and open, constructive dialogue. This will not create 100% consensus among either the elite or the public about what decisions should be made. What it can do, however, is build consensus about the
criteria according to which these decisions are made and ensure that both the public and the policy-makers are able to make informed decisions.

ICPS hopes that this conference will begin to address this need. The purpose of this conference is not to argue either for or against NATO membership—it is to identify which issues lay at the heart of the current arguments about NATO. The questions proposed in this background paper aim both to unlock these issues and to suggest a number of criteria that could help us make a decision. In this way, ICPS hopes to play a small part in setting a future agenda for public debate, consultation and research on Ukraine’s security needs and whether increased integration into NATO is the way to address these needs.

Hypothesis 1: NATO is often presented as the answer, but we still haven’t agreed on the questions

The question “to join or not to join” has overshadowed the whole discussion on NATO. The vast majority of both supporters and opponents of NATO membership have strong views that are often formed on the basis of political or foreign policy preferences. However, it seems likely that both camps then work backwards from these set views to identify the problems/solutions that membership/non-membership would create. This means that they are often arguing at cross-purpose: since there is no shared view of what problems Ukraine faces in the political, military and foreign policy spheres, it is not possible to have a proper discussion about whether cooperation with or integration into NATO would be appropriate methods of addressing these problems.

Security questions

- What are the main threats to Ukraine’s national security?
- How should these threats be prioritized?
- Is the security sector in its current form able to address security threats effectively? How close are Ukrainian security institutions to NATO standards?
- How could further NATO–Ukraine cooperation (MAP and/or membership) help to address these threats?
- Is Western-style security sector reform (SSR) the most effective way to improve the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the security sector (the police, the judiciary branch of government, etc.) in general? Are there any alternative ways of addressing the security threats to Ukraine that could be more effective?
- How much money is Ukraine spending on defense? Is this amount sufficient to ensure an acceptable level of battle readiness? Is it sufficient to support the reforms planned by the Defense Ministry and other agencies? How does Ukraine’s military spending compare with countries that recently joined NATO and other neighboring countries?
Domestic policy questions

- Is Ukraine genuinely committed to reforming its institutions to create a truly European system of government?
- Can NATO have a serious impact on political reform within Ukraine and are NATO-led reforms desirable?
- Will NATO-sponsored security sector reforms aimed at strengthening civilian control over the Armed Forces help to strengthen Ukrainian democracy?
- What is the experience of new members of NATO in this regard and is this experience relevant to Ukraine?

Foreign policy questions

- What are Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities?
- Will further NATO–Ukraine cooperation (MAP and/or membership) strengthen Ukraine’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals, or damage it?
- If Ukraine does not join NATO, will this make it harder to join the EU, or does it not make any difference?

Hypothesis 2: NATO is presented as an either/or question, but little attention is given to the alternatives to eventual membership

At the heart of the argument over NATO membership are questions about whether membership would increase Ukraine’s national, political and economic security and stability. Opponents of NATO membership have been much more successful at criticizing the impact that NATO membership would have than on presenting an alternative scenario that would be more effective in providing this security. Perhaps because of this, supporters of NATO membership have not devoted enough time to explaining why they believe membership to be the best available option. If a referendum about NATO membership is not presented as a choice on a number of alternatives, big questions will remain about Ukraine’s future political and national security regardless of the result.

- Does Ukraine need to be part of a collective security alliance?
- What would happen to NATO–Ukraine relations if Ukraine makes it clear it does not intend to join?
- What impact would the following alternatives to NATO membership have on Ukraine’s security and how feasible are they?
  - Intense cooperation with NATO falling just short of membership
  - Maintenance of the status quo (good cooperation with NATO, but no further integration)
  - The Collective Security Treaty Organization
  - Permanent declaration of neutrality/no affiliation with a particular political bloc
Hypothesis 3: There is confusion about the current state of NATO–Ukraine relations

Most arguments about NATO are centered on the possibility of Ukraine deciding to join NATO or not. Much less attention has been given to the much more immediate question: what is happening at the moment, what do people know about what is happening and what do people think about what is happening?

**Factual questions**

- What practical cooperation is currently taking place between NATO and Ukraine? What areas does NATO–Ukraine cooperation cover?
- What is Intensified Dialogue? How has day-to-day cooperation between Ukraine and the alliance changed since Ukraine began intensified dialogue?
- How has the dynamic of NATO–Ukraine cooperation changed in recent years (under different governments, prime ministers and defense ministers)? Is the number of projects/project areas increasing? Is more money being spent? Are the projects getting more ambitious?
- How does NATO’s cooperation with Ukraine compare with its cooperation with other non-member states, such as other post-Soviet countries (Russia, Georgia, Moldova) and neutral countries (Finland, Switzerland, Ireland)?

**Knowledge questions**

- How much do politicians from different political parties know about the current state of NATO–Ukraine cooperation?
- How much do government officials from different agencies know about this?
- How much does the general public know about this? Are there differences according to location, age, class, education, etc.?

**Attitude questions**

- How is current cooperation with Ukraine evaluated by NATO: By Brussels? By NATO staff working in Ukraine? By member state governments? By troops and civilians who have participated in joint actions?
- How is current cooperation with NATO evaluated by Ukraine: By the Cabinet of Ministers? By the president? By the Ministry of Defense and other “power ministries?” By troops and civilians who have participated in joint actions?
- Does the Ukrainian public support cooperation with NATO as it currently stands?
Political questions

- Have the three events listed at the start had any impact (for better or worse) on the NATO–Ukraine relationship? Have they changed perceptions among NATO decision-makers? Have they changed perceptions among Ukrainian decision-makers?
- What areas or issues have been or remain most problematic in terms of Ukrainian–NATO relations?

Hypothesis 4: There is confusion about the next stage in NATO–Ukraine relations

For much of 2006, it was widely expected that the next stage in Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO would be the development of a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Its very title made it controversial and led many opponents of NATO membership to oppose the idea that Ukraine should develop a MAP. When Viktor Yanukovych announced that Ukraine would not be applying for a MAP at the November 2006 NATO summit in Riga, many supporters of NATO membership equated this with a rejection of NATO membership. Across the political spectrum, it appears that the arguments for and against a MAP have blurred into the argument for and against membership. It should be treated separately. Ukraine cannot join NATO tomorrow, even if it wanted to, so supporters of eventual membership must pay more attention to opportunities for enhancing cooperation with NATO during the next couple of years and the challenges and benefits a MAP might bring; opponents must also pay more attention, since behind the question of membership lies the questions of whether a MAP could be beneficial for Ukraine even if it does not lead to membership and what form of cooperation with NATO is best for Ukraine if membership is not the goal.

Factual questions

- What is a MAP?
- What is the process of application/invitation to a MAP?
- Does a MAP automatically lead to membership in the alliance?
- Does Ukraine have to complete a MAP to be able to join NATO?
- What is the expected content of a Ukrainian MAP?
- Is a MAP the only option for enhanced cooperation between NATO and Ukraine?
- If Ukraine does not agree on a MAP with NATO in Riga, will there be other opportunities to apply?
Knowledge questions

- How much do political elites know about the probable content of a Ukrainian MAP?
- How much does the general public know about the content and aims of MAPs?

Attitude questions

- How does the Yanukovych government feel about the content of the MAP? Is it just the name that causes concern, i.e. if it did not imply eventual membership would it be more attractive—or is the content of the plan unattractive, and if so, in which aspects?
- What do the president, the minister of defense and other vocal advocates of a MAP base their support on?
- Does the general public support application for a MAP and does the knowledge that Ukraine is not obliged to join NATO on completion of a MAP change people’s views in any way?

Policy questions

- What would be the costs and benefits of a MAP? What are the economic consequences? What are the political implications?
- Is Yanukovych’s decision not to seek a MAP at this stage intended simply as a short-term postponement or will it become a longer-term position? Will he and his government do more to explain the costs and benefits of a MAP to the Ukrainian public?
- How would Russia react to Ukraine beginning a MAP? How much importance should Russia’s reaction be given when considering whether to apply?

Hypothesis 5: A public information campaign will fail if it is perceived merely as a pro-NATO propaganda exercise

It has been repeatedly stated that an information campaign is needed to change public perceptions of NATO. This assumes that if people are better informed about NATO, they will become more positive about it. However, the name “information campaign” is somewhat misleading, since the aim of such a campaign would be not only to provide more information, but to change public attitudes in favor of NATO. There are two dangers on the horizon. Firstly, there is very little detailed analysis available about either the level of knowledge or the attitudes of different sections of the Ukrainian public. It is thus difficult to plan such a survey effectively or to measure changes caused by the campaign. Secondly, if the information campaign is perceived as overtly pro-NATO propaganda, it is
unlikely to have the desired effect. A successful campaign must walk a tightrope between providing information, promoting the idea of NATO membership and seeming reasonably objective (see Hypothesis 6).

**Providing information to increase knowledge**

- How much does the general public know about the:
  - current state of NATO-Ukraine relations?
  - content and objectives of a MAP?
  - ways in which NATO has transformed since the end of the Cold War?
  - costs and benefits of membership to the countries that recently joined NATO?
- What information should the public be expected to know about NATO?
- Why have previous information campaigns been unsuccessful?

**Changing attitudes towards NATO**

- What are the most common perceptions of NATO in Ukraine at the moment?
- How much are perceptions of NATO truly built on myths as opposed to well-justified, negative views?
- What information could have the biggest impact on changing public attitudes (this is likely to differ according to age, class, location, etc.)
- What emotional or psychological triggers could have the biggest impact on changing public attitudes?
- Which people are most likely to be persuaded to change their viewpoint and which people are likely to remain fixed on one view?

**Hypothesis 6: When the time for a decision on NATO membership comes, both sides will have to sound more convincing**

So far, it appears that supporters of NATO membership have not done a very good job of convincing the public that they are right. They will have to make a much stronger case for membership in the future if they are to have any hope of winning over public opinion. This will involve presenting a clear argument that acknowledges the potential challenges caused by NATO membership, but convincingly shows that the potential benefits are greater than the dangers. Opponents of NATO membership cannot rest on their laurels either. They must demonstrate that their opposition is fully justified and that they have a credible alternative that will be safer for Ukraine than joining NATO (see Hypothesis 2).
Advantages and disadvantages of NATO membership

What would be the impact of NATO membership on:

— Ukraine’s Armed Forces?
— Ukraine’s police, judicial system and other security agencies?
— Ukraine’s defense manufacturing industry and exports?
— The relationship between Ukraine and Russia?
— The threat to Ukraine from international terrorism?
— Ukraine’s political system and democratic development?
— Ukraine’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals?
— Ukraine’s ability to influence NATO’s defense and security policy and international policy in general?
Section 2

Ukraine’s security policy and reforms
Security threats assessment

Introduction

Analysis of internal and external security threats to the country and its citizens should be based on plans for reforms or modernization of the security sector. After all, if there is no clear vision of the threats against which the country must defend itself, it is impossible to be certain that the existing security sector institutions are optimally structured to counteract these threats. However, until now, Ukrainian society has led almost no serious dialogue regarding security and threat perceptions. This was partly inherited from the Soviet era when all defense and security issues were the prerogative of the state and were, as a rule, concealed behind the screen of secrecy. In addition, however, this is also a natural consequence of the economic problems Ukraine faced in the 1990s, when almost all Ukrainian citizens faced the single problem of survival. Further, there is still very little understanding that broader security, which covers not only state and national security, but also personal, economic and environmental security among other types, is a matter of concern for every Ukrainian. Therefore, this is an area where the public must be involved. The public must influence policies developed and implemented in this sector. One way or another, it will be difficult for the public to play any role or simply to clearly formulate its opinions on these matters if it does not have access to relevant information. Unfortunately, security problems very rarely become the center of public consultations and this research proves that debates on NATO (and related problems, such as security challenges, and their solutions, such as whether joining NATO will help react to these challenges), generally only make hay of these issues. As a result, people have little understanding of how these issues are related to their everyday lives.

The next challenge is the confusion on these issues at the expert level. While a thorough analysis of the security context is, without a doubt, of great importance from the theoretical point of view, the quality of this analysis in practice is far from the desired. This undermines the entire bulk of other work carried out in this area, starting from planning reforms in the ministries that deal with security issues to identifying and stimulating Ukraine’s foreign political interests. At the official level, this analysis is reflected in several documents, such as the law on the principles of national security, the National Security Concept (which has not been published yet), the Doctrine of Defense and the White Paper on Security Matters. In practice, the majority of information presented in these documents is declarative and has very little applied meaning. Furthermore, priorities of threats are weakly ordered from the most urgent to the most serious. And finally, it is not clear to what extent these laws are really used as a basis for making policies and planning reforms.

The above problems are discussed in this section. The goal of this section is to shed more light on key threats to national security at the moment, the relation between
internal and external threats and the partner network that Ukraine is unfolding to protect its security at the regional level.

The balance between internal and external security threats

Realizing priority threats to the country’s national security is the key to implementing a well thought-out defense policy. While foreign political risk factors play their role in discussing international issues and determine the possibility of Ukrainian membership in international alliances, internal risk factors could significantly affect the success of reforms, including defense reform, and the effectiveness of implementing defense policy as a whole. The nature of national security threats has changed because internal threats have become more significant.

Among the foreign political risk factors, the top priority issues are:

- foreign threats to the energy security of Ukraine; and
- stronger regional trends that could lead to the escalation of conflicts close to the Ukrainian borders (Transnistria) and threats of separatism from Crimean Tartars.

According to experts at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, stronger regional trends are direct consequences of the globalization process, which is responsible for such threats as terrorism, local conflicts, the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled illegal migration and stronger international organized crime and drug trafficking. Since a unipolar security system is not capable of combating these phenomena, the role of regional groups and the concept of a “multi-polar world” are noticeably growing. At the same time, this “multi-polar world” has huge conflict-bearing potential and gives birth to numerous conflicts at the regional level and, sometimes, the struggle for regional leadership and domination in certain regions. Along with the United States, candidates vying for the role of regional leaders are Russia, China and the European Union.

This struggle for leadership explains the policy of Russia towards Ukraine. If we consider the role of some Russian parties in rousing separatism among the Ukrainian population and hindering the solution of the problematic issues of the Black Sea Fleet and the Tuzla peninsula, which has created conflicts between the Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking population, the main spectrum of

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threats to national security interests arises specifically at the regional level. Thus, the negative consequences caused by regional trends seem to be more dangerous than global challenges that also include transborder organized crime, illegal migration, human trafficking and smuggling.

The priority internal risk factors are:

- Corruption in government bodies, including in law enforcement bodies and their liaisons with criminal rings on Ukrainian territory (having avoided international conflicts, Ukraine has become attractive to international and ethnic organized crime rings that mostly include players in the shadow economy, drug dealers, arms dealers and individuals who are avoiding criminal prosecution in their home countries); and
- The split of Ukrainian voters according to their ideological views on human values that are the source of potential conflicts between the West and the East.

The principles of internal security and the Doctrine of Defense

The principles of internal security are determined by the status and terms of operation of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and law enforcement bodies. Internal security is also formed by the instituting of joint border protection and the growing norms in dealing with granting asylum to immigrants that meet EU standards. In addition, the lack of external and internal risk factors, nuclear safety and energy security provide for stable economic development and have a mirror effect on supporting the principles of internal security. Taking these facts into consideration, the need to invest in new energy resource deposits, develop new alternative types of energy and technologies and diversify the energy supply sources must be prioritized.

The status of the Armed Forces is identified in the State Program for Developing and Reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the next five years. The Ministry of Defense has developed a Draft State Program for 2006—2011. It is expected that this program will provide the necessary resources to implement military reform and will pay more attention to the current risks to national security that were underestimated in the previous concept for the 2001—2005 program, such as terrorism, conflicts between allies involved in peacekeeping operations, border military conflicts and the weakening of Ukraine’s defensive capabilities.

External and internal risk factors were identified in the Military Doctrine of 2004, which had been developed on the basis of the Concept of National Security of 1997. However, according to specialists, the publication of a list consisting of 11 external and internal (both real and potential) military threats to Ukraine’s national security was not a significant step towards quality and the appropriate
Identification of military policy principles. In addition, some unclearly identified internal threats complicated the process of justification for planners of national security. The dangerously lowering level of support for the country’s Armed Forces with military and specialized equipment and new generation weapons that threatens to weaken their fighting capacity, slow reform of the country’s military organization and defense and industrial complex, inadequate financial support to implement relevant programs, the accumulation of surplus, outdated military and defense equipment and machinery and explosive substances in the country’s Armed Forces do not constitute specific evaluations of threats. In addition, inadequate attention was paid to evaluating the actions of likely adversaries.

The actual lack of preparation in formulating specific threats resulted in the lack of a clear explanation for the need to support the Armed Forces in their current state. This could also explain the proposal of former President Leonid Kuchma to reject outdated views on military threats and the construction of the Army based on the principles of defense sufficiency in favor of allowing the country’s economic capacities to guide policy. There is no need to mention that, given the lack of powerful economic capacities, this understanding of the operation of the Armed Forces would result in the loss of the country’s defensive capacity during a short period of time and the country’s vulnerability to external aggressions.

As a rule, the overall conclusion of conceptual documents is that the military political situation is described by a lack of clarity and the presence of ambiguity. Ukrainian military specialists say the most balanced approach would be to identify modern military threats to Ukraine’s national security following four basic scenarios:

1. The large-scale armed aggression against Ukraine (in order to occupy the entire territory of the country);
2. The emergence of a limited (local) armed conflict against Ukraine (in order to occupy/seize a part of the country’s territory);
3. The provocation of an armed border conflict (in order to force Ukraine to make concessions in border disputes); and
4. Concealed undermining activity (in order to undermine the military might of Ukraine and make it vulnerable and concessive to political and economic pressure).

In addition, to reform the country’s Armed Forces effectively, it makes sense to realize the new objectives that western specialists consider in terms of implementing four main components:

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3 Ibid.
• The establishment of direct contacts with military institutions of various countries (in order to establish mutual understanding and trust on the overall human level);

• The promotion of democratic transformations (relations between the civilian and military sectors of the society, civilian control of the Armed Forces);

• The enhancement of operating compatibility (doctrines, armament and military equipment, opinions on the use of the Armed Forces); and

• The achievement of goals of real security (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and armament control).

Understanding the new objectives of the Armed Forces is necessary in raising their role as a flexible foreign policy instrument to form a modern security system in the world. The White Paper on Security Matters of France formulates the objectives of the Armed Forces in the international sphere. In response, the United Kingdom introduced the new term of “defense diplomacy” in 1998 to justify the activity of the Armed Forces to support national interests on the international arena, which was later included as a priority objective for the Ministry of Defense. In 2000, similar objectives were identified as priorities for the Armed Forces of Greece (Nesterov, 2004).

Allies, partners and potential adversaries of Ukraine

Depending on the convergence or divergence of military political and foreign political interests, it is possible to distinguish several types of military political relations: confrontation, coexistence, cooperation, partnership and alliance.⁵

Partners

Partnership relations are described by the lack of significant disputes between the countries and the presence of mutual interest in mutually beneficial cooperation in various sectors of national security and defense. Partnership provides for the possibility of a common problem and a joint approach to its solution. It also stipulates a vision of joint ways to realize the national interests of partner countries and coordinated positions and actions related to the solution of certain common problems. At the same time, in the instance of partnership relations, the partner country reserves for itself the right to implement independent policy and to have an independent position that can diverge or have significant differences from the position of its partner. Partnership relations do not provide for the establishment of common bodies or the strict coordination of actions.


⁵ P. Rudiakov and O. Kovaliova. Cited work.
After the end of the Cold War, partnership and alliance relations began to dominate among Central and Eastern European countries. These relations were mostly caused by the collapse of a bipolar world and the transition to a unipolar system of international security. However, this process did not exclude the emergence of new disputes among countries that declared their inclination to establish partner military political relations with leading world powers. Thus, partnership relations between countries were developing at various levels.

There are three levels of Ukrainian partnership relations with other countries, which are: the level of partnership, the level of special partnership and the level of strategic partnership.

According to official declarations, Ukraine supports the level of special partnership relations with Canada, Georgia and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization. The intention “to develop mutual relations as friendly countries based on the principles of special partnership” was declared in the Joint Declaration on Special Partnership between Ukraine and Canada on 31 March 1994. The 2 October 1999 Declaration on Developing Special Partnership Relations between Georgia and Ukraine stipulates that the parties “will deepen bilateral cooperation with the aim to achieve a qualitatively new level of special partnership.” The intention of the parties to develop special partnership was also written into the Charter on Special Partnership between Ukraine and the North-Atlantic Alliance that was signed in July 1997.

The term special partnership, apparently, draws attention to certain specific features describing relations between partners at such a level. As for Ukrainian–Canadian relations, some historical and demographic factors related to the availability of a rather influential Ukrainian diaspora in Canada can be singled out in the capacity of such specific circumstances. Thanks to these relations, Ukraine has reasons to view Canada as a patron that could lobby for its interests in European matters. The special nature of Ukrainian–Georgian relations is determined, primarily, by the post-Soviet context and intentions to engage in the European integration processes.

The most important criterion for strategic partnership is common strategic interests: support with energy resources, food products and other types of strategic and natural resources, secure access to vitally important regions of the world and the national security of a country. Strategic interests are related, first of all, to military, political, economic and foreign relations. According to specialists from The Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies (2000), “strategic partnership is based on geopolitical interdependence, sometimes—on the geographical and cultural proximity of two countries. In specific instances, the search for strategic partners is conditioned by the willingness of a country to become a regional or world leader”. In contrast to this, Oleh Soskin thinks that the convergence of strategic development goals of the relevant countries and
the objective similarity of their core geopolitical and geoeconomic interests are more important than the geographical and cultural proximity of the involved countries. Given this, neither Israel, nor Russia, nor Azerbaijan can become Ukraine’s strategic partner.\(^6\)

During the period of “multi-vector policy”, strategic partnership was practically the most favorable term of the country’s political leadership and top Ukrainian diplomats used this powerful mechanism “in an amateurishly brainless manner”.\(^7\) According to the above criteria, statements and documents at that time Ukraine had labeled approximately 20 countries with the status of strategic partner. At the implementation level alone, Ukraine had strategic partnership relations with six countries—the US, Russia, Azerbaijan, Poland, Bulgaria and Uzbekistan.

In addition, Ukraine’s strategic partners were all neighboring countries and, if we proceed from official statements, another five countries are also included into this list. However, proceeding from the definition of strategic partnership, the area where the country focuses its main resources to achieve the main strategic goal does not envisage a large number of strategic partners. Particularly, this is applicable to Ukraine with its limited resources. Currently, the list of Ukraine’s strategic partners contains one international alliance and two countries listed by priority—the EU, Russia and the US. It makes sense to mention that the relations between Ukraine and the EU are based on the idea of supporting partnership and not gaining membership in the EU. If we refer to accession, Ukraine must identify its relations with the EU using the concept of ally instead of partner.

**Allies**

Alliance relations provide for the availability of rather strict commitments to other members in the alliance that are related to supporting their national security and defense. The needed pre-condition for alliance relations is the availability of common government bodies whose decisions are binding for each member country. Alliance relations significantly strengthen the state of the country’s national security and its defensive capacity, but, at the same time, they significantly restrict the possibility of a country making independent decisions and implementing independent policies in the area of security and defense. Alliance relations develop not only as a result of converging national interests in the area of security and defense, but also when there is a common adversary or a common military threat. These last factors project as integrators of setting up an alliance and establishing allied international relations. Allied relations are established by way of concluding a bilateral military political treaty on mutual assistance in the area of security and defense or acceding to military political blocs.

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7 Ibid.
In the instance of Ukraine, a purely geographical factor determines that real military allies can be only NATO, a military-political alliance or Russia.

It makes sense to distinguish the US from the number of NATO member states as a superpower that has individual interests in all regions across the world, specifically in Ukraine. As the formation of an integral concept for the strategic choice of Ukraine’s geopolitical model provides for correct identification of its strategic allies and partners, Ukraine made its choice in favor of NATO and emphasized in an amendment to its Military Doctrine that accession to NATO is “the final goal of the Euro-Atlantic integration policy.” At the same time, internal factors and the internal situation play an important role in determining Ukraine’s international position and its geopolitical coordinates. If its predictability and stability is guaranteed, it will not be difficult to secure its relations with allies that must rely on Ukraine’s promises and not on the multi-vector policy of the previous period.

Adversaries

It is well known that Ukraine does not have enemies in the modern world and does not view any country as a potential adversary. However, this theoretical absence of obvious enemies and potential adversaries in no way means that the country does not have severe and pragmatic competitors in the form of foreign countries that are close to and far from Ukraine or sources of disputes. Identification of the sources of the main external threats in economic, political, socio-cultural and information areas is important to set up an appropriate system for counteracting and neutralizing these threats, implementing effective reforms of the economy, the Armed Forces and the national security system. In addition, according to Leonid Poliakov, given the inadequately clear issue of (or political inexpediency of openly identifying) a potential adversary to secure defense planning, it seems that an appropriate approach would be to develop the most likely scenarios that would reflect both threats and economic realities, instead of emphasizing threats or economic capacities.

Thus, Ukraine and Romania are in the process of resolving a dispute in the UN International Court of Justice that deals with the line of the state border on the Danube River (the Kiliya mouth) from Pardyne, a settlement, to the Black Sea. This is needed to sign the agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf.

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8 L. Poliakov. Cited work.
11 L. Poliakov. Cited work.
and the exclusive (maritime) economic zones of both countries in the Black Sea. The issue of identifying the border in this section is a problematic issue because it is related to the question of ownership for prospective oil- and gas-bearing deposits. Diplomats are working on the idea of joint utilization of this region. Today, however, this idea is debatable.

Relations with Russia are also complicated on many issues, such as the demarcation of the state border, the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the Readmission Treaty. At the same time, the role of Russia is needed to resolve the Transnistria conflict, situated in an area to which Russia has deployed peacekeeping troops. Given the lack of decisions, the Ukrainian–Moldovan section of the state border continues to be one of the main channels for transporting smuggled goods to Ukraine.

International guarantees for Ukraine’s security

Ukraine’s neutrality

Recently, the issue of securing Ukraine’s status as a neutral country that cannot be a member of any military bloc has been frequently raised by political forces that are against Ukraine’s membership in NATO as an alternative decision to guarantee Ukraine’s national security.

In official Ukrainian state documents, the neutrality and non-bloc status of the country is mentioned only in the Declaration on State Sovereignty of 1991. In this document, “the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic solemnly announces its intention to become a permanently neutral country in the future that does not participate in military blocs and follows the three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons.” At that time, the declaration to become a neutral country was addressed, first of all, to Russia as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, which found it hard to refuse having military political influence on Ukraine.

The confirmation of these fears was proposals to Kyiv to join the Tashkent Treaty or to sign bilateral agreements on setting up a military alliance. The non-bloc status made it possible to escape this trap. It also corresponded to the internal political situation in Ukraine the most, which was described by the different geopolitical orientation of its western and eastern regions. Thus, this status allowed for the preservation of internal political stability in the country and corresponded to challenges of the uncertain military political situation in Europe in 1990s.

At that time, it was still unknown whether NATO would be a structure for European collective security or simply a military bloc designed to resolve objectives of collective defense.
The policy of neutrality offers Ukraine a number of benefits that include equal economic relations with all countries, regardless of their affiliation with military political blocs, as well as reduced tension in society regarding the solution to the question of Ukraine’s orientation towards “West” or “East.” In this context, neutrality fosters unity between Ukrainian citizens and national development and could become a “uniting idea of the nation,” something that is important during the post-revolution period.

However, NATO’s expansion towards the East, shrinking armaments and the military component in the overall NATO budget and the emergence of new possibilities to appropriately react to the newest security challenges give grounds to speak about a “new,” other NATO that, according to the number of its members and functions, is transforming more and more into a military political organization and today is becoming the core of the new European security model. In the context of setting up a single Europe, NATO expansion pursues military political and foreign political goals. NATO views its relations with Eastern European countries through the prism of geopolitical interests where the foreign and military political course of these countries and their internal political stability play an important role for building the Euro-Atlantic security system.

Given this, “the emergence of economic, environmental and other non-power security aspects on the foreground reduces the role of the classical, non-bloc status and even makes it questionable.” 12 In addition, Ukraine’s neutral, value-related orientation in the circle of its strategic partners that have different social values and priorities is, under current circumstances, impossible, while the position of equidistance is non-functional.

**Ukraine’s membership in NATO**

Amendments to the 21 April 2005 presidential decree on the military doctrine of Ukraine determined that the final goal of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration policy “is accession to NATO as the foundation of the overall European security system.” These amendments also declared that the country’s national interests in the environment of the current military political situation conditioned “the significant deepening of relations with NATO and the EU.” Proceeding from the fact that “NATO and the EU are guarantors of security and stability in Europe,” the Doctrine indicates that “Ukraine is preparing for full-fledged membership in these organizations.” The new concept of this document is based on the realization that Ukraine, as a country with a weak defensive capacity, does not count on its own forces, but relies on joining the system of collective defense and security, which is the role of NATO in Europe.

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12 O. Derhachov. Cited work.
In addition to receiving international security guarantees, an important benefit of Ukraine’s accession to NATO, in the opinion of numerous specialists, is the implementation of the model called “Ukraine’s integration into the EU through NATO.” This formula is used by countries that have not achieved European Union standards in terms of their economic and political development. Therefore, these countries view NATO membership as the main pre-condition for their accession to the EU.

The advantage of this way of integration into the European community is that accession to NATO allows candidate countries to finally leave the sphere of Russian influence (where the majority of Central and Eastern European countries saw a source of threats to their own national security), to receive reliable security guarantees and to consolidate the principles of democratic governance in the country. However, the main thing these candidate countries achieve by implementing this strategy is the acquisition of a powerful engine for promoting their interests in the European Union in the form of NATO and the US.

Other advantages of joining the collective security system include the possibility of reducing resource expenditures in order to achieve military political goals by leaning upon a certain balance of forces and interests among allied countries. Truthfully, reducing resource expenditures is a debatable issue, along with the cost of the so-called “10-Year Plan for Ukraine’s Accession to NATO,” which some media evaluated at EUR 300bn. If this figure is compared with Ukraine’s military budget for 2005 (EUR 1.1bn), the country could go into debt.

A limited military budget and commitments to meet NATO’s military requirements, specifically, within objectives set for the national Armed Forces (The Initiative for Defense Capacities, 1999), and participating in specific NATO operations are serious challenges for Ukraine.

So far, Ukraine does not meet the majority of criteria set forth by NATO. The country has neither the economic nor the financial capacities to make a contribution to collective security and defense of the alliance. For this purpose, Ukraine must increase its defense budget approximately 400–500% and implement a number of reforms in the law enforcement, judicial and social areas.

Military reform and the radical re-organization of the Armed Forces is a separate question. While the Rapid Deployment Forces are well prepared, equipped and compatible with NATO troops and can be deployed within international

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peacekeeping operations, the rest of the troops are suffering from inadequate financing and are of little use even for territorial defense.

Other potential problems for joining NATO include the further complication of relations with Russia. The incomplete international legal execution of the state border with Russia and Russia’s military presence on Ukrainian territory would inhibit Ukraine from fully enjoying all the benefits of NATO membership and complicate the accession process.

However, the biggest problem is the lack of support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO among its population. Soviet-era stereotypes are supported by Ukrainians’ ignorance of the essence of Ukraine’s integration into NATO. Given that 18 out of 23 areas of cooperation (80% of the events of the Ukraine–NATO Target Plan) are not military, 44.3% of the population still thinks that NATO is “an aggressive military alliance.”

CIS/CSTO

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of CIS countries, which Ukraine was offered membership in during the Kuchma administration, has not become an effective system for supporting the security of its participants. Restriction of Ukraine’s participation in the structures of the Tashkent Treaty to the status of an observer, motivated by its non-bloc status, was justified. None of the conflicts within and between the treaty’s participant countries were finally resolved, primarily because Russia saw this treaty as a mechanism for strengthening its military political domination over the CSTO member states and constantly tried to transform the Tashkent Treaty into a defense alliance.

In fact, even at that time, this defense alliance already existed within this treaty at the level of bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus, which were regulated by the Statute of the Russian–Belarusian Union and the Agreement on the Military-Political Activity of Military Departments. The attempts to persuade Kyiv to sign the Tashkent Treaty were made by way of involving Ukraine in the “common defense area” with the help of signing specific interdepartmental and interstate agreements and holding joint events of an openly defense-related nature.

Ukraine signed the Agreement on the United System for Anti-Aircraft Defense, the Agreement on the Means of the System for Warning of Missile Attack and the Control of Space and the Agreement on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which will be a military presence on Ukrainian territory until 2017.
Organization of the security sector and security sector reform

Introduction

When Ukraine became independent in 1991, it needed to set up its own institutions of state in a very short period of time. Naturally, it relied on the resources it had at hand: i.e. the old Soviet security sector, parts of which it had inherited. This inheritance included both physical resources (troops, weaponry, equipment, buildings, etc.) and administrative resources (structures of departments/agencies/ministries, constitutional, legal and internal regulatory frameworks and personnel and working methods).

Given the pressing need for some kind of functioning institutions, the lack of external support and the overwhelming nature of the Soviet legacy, it is not surprising that the Ukrainian security sector suffered multiple problems. In time, however, this approach demonstrated its weaknesses. Above all, the Ukrainian state was hindered by the fact that it inherited not only physical and administrative resources from the Soviet Union, but also cultural and social factors, such as the attitude towards the entire concept of security (whose security are we protecting, what are the main threats to this security and what should be the state’s role in providing it?) and pre-conceived ideas about how the security sector should be managed.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, there have been great changes to the major threats to security at the international level and in Europe. A major international war between states on the European continent seems unlikely, meanwhile, there has been a growth in transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime and environmental catastrophes, all of which require a multilateral response. This has stimulated changes to how the whole concept of “security” is perceived internationally, with a shift from the state-centric focus on “national security” or “state security” towards a doctrine of “human security” which places more emphasis on the individual. This trend is particularly relevant to countries that have undergone (or are undergoing) the transition from an authoritarian past towards full democracy, which requires security actors to change their whole approach to their citizens from repression to protection.

This is the security context in which Ukraine must restructure and reform its security sector. Ukraine is not the only country that has faced this challenge, however, and while every situation is unique, there is much experience that
Ukraine can learn or share with other countries that have tried or are trying to reform their security sectors according to modern demands. This refers to a body of policy and practice known as “security sector reform” (SSR) which has been developed by international security policy-makers, practitioners and academics. This chapter considers the transformation of the Ukrainian security sector in the light of this international experience.

This section first defines the concepts of the “security sector” and “security sector reform” as they are understood in this context, and then considers how SSR may be relevant to Ukraine. This is not intended to be a comprehensive review of SSR in Ukraine, which would require a separate study; nor does it look specifically at military reforms, which are explored in more detail elsewhere.

The security sector

As noted above, the period since the Cold War has seen a significant change in the concept of security, away from a focus on military matters towards a broader concept that pays greater intention to human security, environmental security, economic security, etc. In parallel with this change of focus, there has been a significant change at the international level about the perceived boundaries and roles of the “security sector”. Where once this may have been largely synonymous with the concept of “siloviki” that is common to the former Soviet Union, the contemporary concept of the security sector is much broader, encompassing the whole range of institutions that play a role in providing security—including the civilian structures that manage the agencies that are authorised to use force, and the justice and law enforcement institutions that provide the legal basis for the maintenance of security. Some definitions spread the net even wider, considering a wider “security community” that includes both militarised and non-militarised non-state actors that engage in security matters, from paramilitary organisations through to academics. In this paper, however, the emphasis is on the formal security sector, i.e. organisations authorised to use force, civil management and oversight bodies, and justice and law-enforcement institutions.

Security sector reform and security sector governance

Though there is no internationally agreed definition of SSR, analysts have identified four main areas which are generally perceived to constitute SSR. These are:

- Strengthening democratic control over security institutions, by the state and civil society (including improved policy development and implementation and expenditure management).
• Professionalisation of the security forces.
• Demilitarisation and peace-building (particularly in post-conflict situations).
• Strengthening the rule of law.¹⁵

As can be seen from this list, SSR goes way beyond simply modernizing the Armed Forces. Firstly, security sector reform can equally apply to other parts of the security sector, such as the police or the intelligence services. Secondly, there is a major emphasis on strengthening security sector governance, i.e. the extent to which the security sector is managed democratically (whether it is transparent, whether the sector follows the policy goals set by the government rather than attempting to operate in its own interests, whether policy is made in a coherent and inclusive way, etc.) and effectively (whether it uses resources effectively, whether policy is logical and implemented properly, whether the sector achieves the goals the government has set).

Another aspect of SSR, which deserves to be highlighted separately, is the emphasis on the efficiency of the security sector as a sector, rather than focusing on each of its components separately. Just as the majority of new security threats require greater coordination across borders, they also require improved cooperation between different security actors. For example, anti-terrorist operations may have intelligence, police and even military components, which will require effective information-sharing. As another example, there is no point having an improved police service with much greater investigative strength if the judicial system is unprepared to process the new cases and evidence provided in a professional manner.

Security sector reform in Ukraine? A piecemeal approach

Is the SSR concept described above relevant to Ukraine? In theory, it should be very attractive, because it seeks to address many of the problems that the Ukrainian security sector faces: inefficiency; lack of professionalism; lack of inter-agency coordination; weak rule of law; insufficient standards of democratic governance; and a post-authoritarian context where state security institutions largely define their roles according to their own interests, rather than the interests of their citizens. These are all serious problems, and Ukrainian governments have repeatedly stated their intention to deal with these issues. Yet in practice, it is clear that reforms in Ukraine are currently far from the ideal of coordinated SSR presented above. There are several reasons for this.

As noted in chapter “Security threats assessment,” Ukraine has yet to come up with an adequate analysis of the major threats to its security or prioritized these threats appropriately. Without a clear conception of the main security threats, it is impossible either to consider whether the security sector is countering these threats in the most effective way, or to design a coherent reform package with the goal of strengthening the security sector’s capacity to respond to these threats. Thus until a genuine attempt is made to develop a National Security Concept that is truly strategic, it will be impossible to develop a coherent SSR policy.

Furthermore, the necessity of inter-agency cooperation is not sufficiently appreciated within much of the Ukrainian state, and even where it is, mechanisms to ensure such cooperation remain ineffective. There is still a strong tendency for each ministry and agency to see their role in isolation, without considering how their work impacts on or is affected by other ministries. Information sharing between agencies is often very poor. Furthermore, a confusion of responsibilities and authorities means that rather than working together, different ministries perceive themselves to be in direct competition with each other.

Little attempt has been made to force the whole range of security sector actors to cooperate. This is a signal that security sector reform has not generally been backed by sufficient political will. Though the goal of reform is regularly name-checked by politicians of all stripes, in practice they have not demonstrated the political engagement and leadership needed to drive the process forward. This is reflected in the relative inactivity of the National Security Council (NSC).

In theory, the NSC is the logical center for the coordination of SSR policy and implementation. Yet in practice, the NSC has not fulfilled this role to any great extent. This is in part because its mandate has been defined so broadly that almost anything can be considered a security matter: though most issues have a security dimension, this sort of mission creep has meant that the NSC does not appear to have a coherent vision of its most important tasks. Things are further confused by the NSC’s combination of analytical functions, coordination mechanisms, and its role as a “talking-shop” for senior political figures, including both the President and the Prime Minister has extended this mission creep. Given the political utility of such a forum, there is a strong temptation to use it for purposes other than the coordination of Ukraine’s security and defense policies, as the past couple of years have shown. Lastly, it is unclear how much power the NSC has to actually lead and manage the reform process by having authority over specific ministries; without any enforcement mechanisms of its own, it is difficult to ensure that ministries stick to a coordinated line.

Without a proper high-level co-ordination mechanism overseeing SSR, reforms in different ministries and agencies together have rather been linked together to ensure that reforms go at a similar pace across the board. Instead, the pace
and depth of reform depends very much on the minister and senior officials responsible, and positive reforms are in constant danger of coming to a standstill whenever there is a change in the leadership. The result is that while there have been some significant reforms in some parts of the security sector, notably in the Armed Forces (see Chapter “Structural reform of the Armed Forces” on p. 37), they are unsystematic, uncoordinated and may turn out to be unsustainable.

**Democratic governance of the Ukrainian security sector**

Strengthening democratic control of security institutions is considered to be crucial to the success or failure of security sector reform. The purpose is twofold. Firstly, the military or other security sector institutions very often inhibit the democratic process. This is particularly true in countries in transition after a period of authoritarianism or conflict. The reason is that in such situations, the military, intelligence services, police and other actors tend to have developed with purposes other than upholding the democratic order in mind. In some cases, this may present a direct threat to the regime, such as when a strong military decides to hold a coup d’état; in other cases, it is simply the fact that these institutions were trained to repress their own citizens rather than protect them, and need strong oversight to ensure that they do not fall back into bad ways; in yet other cases, individuals within these institutions may also take advantage of their privileged position for personal gain.

Secondly, the experience of Western governments suggests that high levels of democratic control are not just good for democracy, but also for the security institutions themselves. The separation of civilian oversight and administrative management from operational matters allows security practitioners to concentrate on their strengths. Higher levels of transparency improve standards and reduce opportunities for corruption; this in turn improves public trust in security sector institutions, which allows them to do their work more efficiently (especially in areas such as policing and intelligence, where public support can be crucial).

Democratic control of the security sector is a regular topic of discussion in policy circles and all Ukrainian governments in the last decade have committed themselves to making further improvements to the level of democratic control. It is possible to point to a number of achievements over recent years:

- The adoption of a Law on Democratic Civilian Control over the Military Organisation and Law Enforcement Authorities;
- The ratio of civilian to military personnel in the Ministry of Defense now stands at 76:24;
- The Ministry of Defense has published its first White Paper on Defense, and made a commitment to updating the paper every year;
• The Ministry of Defense has released a public report on its activities which is easily accessible on the internet;
• Many security institutions have established public councils allowing for regular contact with non-governmental representatives; and
• Along with NATO, there is a Joint Working Group on Defense Reform programme for Professional Development of Civilian Personnel; a NATO–Ukraine Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development; and a NATO–Ukraine Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the Intelligence Sector.

Despite these positive changes, however, the Ukrainian security sector is still in the early phases of the transformation of its security culture. Firstly, although it is changing, the assumption in security matters is usually that information should be kept secret unless there is a good reason to publish it—the opposite of a transparent democratic approach where information is made available unless there are explicit security reasons for not doing so. Secondly, although formal changes to organizational and staffing structures to boost civilian control are necessary, they cannot in themselves ensure that the quality of democratic oversight improves since this is dependent on the capacity of these institutions and the skills of those that run them. Building up competent civilian personnel and strengthening democratic oversight procedures is a long-term process that Ukraine has only recently begun.

**NATO and security sector reform**

NATO has stated its intention to promote and support SSR initiatives with partner countries, irrespective of whether they intend to join the alliance or not. For countries that do have a membership perspective, these reforms are crucial to establishing suitable standards of democracy and effectiveness to which all member states are expected to adhere. However, NATO also promotes SSR in countries that do not intend to join the alliance because it is believed that countries with higher standards of security sector governance are more likely to maintain friendly and mutually beneficial relations with NATO. Hence, NATO is prepared to support SSR initiatives in Ukraine regardless of whether Ukraine joins NATO or not.

It should be noted that until recently, NATO’s support for SSR in Ukraine was also far from comprehensive, with the lion’s share of attention going on military matters through the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. In the last couple of years, however, NATO has expanded this group to focus on broader SSR, including intelligence reform. NATO is working with the Ukrainian government to carry out a security sector review, an official analysis of Ukraine’s security sector needs, expected to be completed in 2007.
Conclusion

The need for far-reaching reforms of the security sector in Ukraine is well-recognized within policy circles. Yet the Ukrainian government has not accepted the concept of SSR as a package. Few attempts have been made to coordinate reforms either at a senior political level or at an operational level and so reforms in different ministries are taking place with different vectors in a piecemeal fashion. This is surely better than no reform at all, but it is still inefficient and means that even good reforms are fragile and may not be sustainable. As a result, limited resources are in danger of being wasted and the ongoing process of democratization may extend to the security sector at a disappointingly slow rate.

Regardless of the foreign policy decisions that are made in Ukraine with regard to the issue of NATO membership, Ukraine has much to gain from deepening its engagement with NATO on SSR. NATO has significant experience in this field, much of which comes from Central and Eastern Europe and is easily transferable to Ukraine.

Most importantly, however, there needs to be greater political commitment from the highest levels in both the Presidential Secretariat and the Cabinet of Ministers to tackle reforms of the security sector in a more coordinated fashion. This will require greater strategic planning, improved interagency cooperation and more cross-party dialogue. If the NSC cannot fulfill this role effectively, alternative coordination mechanisms should be considered, such as the establishment of a high-level, inter-agency working group on security sector reform.
Structural reform of the Armed Forces

The main results of reforming the Armed Forces

Reform of the Army is a multi-aspect process that includes political, economic, social, legal and many other components. The need to reform the Armed Forces in Ukraine is the result of both the inertial structure of the Army that was inherited from the Soviet Union and the new military political situation in Eurasia. The new situation requires new principles for manning, sets the objective of rapid deployment of mobile subdivisions in hot spots, planning according to the options for the development of a conflict and harmonization of the Army structure with structures of armies of other countries to raise compatibility of subdivisions in joint military operations.

Large-scale reforms of the Armed Forces began with the Program for State Support for Reforming and Developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2005 that was adopted in 2000. The Program provided for updating the regulatory and legislative base for the activity of the Armed Forces and their structure and management, reducing the number of personnel, weapons and military equipment and machinery in the Armed Forces and switching to contract-based manning.

Since the beginning of work on this program, the country expanded the regulatory and legislative fields of activity of the Armed Forces and their reforms. This made it possible to switch to a three-type structure and to begin gradually reducing the number of personnel. Later, in 2003—2004, Ukraine carried out a defense survey. The results of this survey were used to publish the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine until 2015, which identified the further development of the Armed Forces as bringing the national system of defense planning in line with the highest standards.

An important step in outlining the strategy of military reforms was the approval of the country’s Military Doctrine in 2004. However, the time of approving the Military Doctrine—the pre-election period of the presidential campaign—made certain amendments to its contents. As a result, the doctrine did not describe a clear-cut military political orientation for Ukraine. Blurred orientation of the country complicated decision-making for the management of the Army and military planning. Thus, a Decree issued by President Viktor Yushchenko introduced amendments to the Military Doctrine in 2005. The essence of changes was to identify that accession to NATO as a basis for a general European security system was the final goal of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

16 This chapter is based on The Defense Policy of Ukraine. White Paper 2005.
As part of the reforms in 2000–2005, a functional principle for building the Armed Forces was introduced. Amendments to the law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine initiated the transformation of the Army from a four-type structure to a three-type structure in 2004. Specifically, the Air Forces and the Anti-Aircraft Defense Troops merged into a consolidated body—the Air Forces with air commands (West, South and Center) and the tactical group Crimea, subordinated to South command.

From the functional point of view, Ukraine separated its Armed Forces into the United Forces of Rapid Deployment, the Main Defense Forces and the Strategic Reserves. Among these three groups, the development of the United Forces of Rapid Deployment was prioritized. As part of the general reform, the country formed the Command of the Support Forces that began to include units of information and technical and rear support of the Armed Forces.

In 2002, Ukraine disbanded the 43rd Rocket Army, which helped it confirm adherence to its commitment as a non-nuclear country. Overall, the number of personnel in the Armed Forces is being gradually reduced. For example, during the last five years, the country cut almost 171,000 positions. The problem with the process of reducing the number of personnel continues to violate the proportions between the units supporting the vital activity of the Armed Forces and combat units as such. Thus, for example, in 2005, this ratio in the Land Forces reached two support units per one combat unit. The same problem exists with synchronizing the process of taking military equipment and machinery out of service, on one hand, and reducing the numbers of personnel, on the other. In the opinion of military experts from the Ministry of Defense and the General Headquarters, further reduction of the Armed Forces must be based on reducing the number of personnel engaged in supporting the Armed Forces.

Support of the Army with weapons

Support of a modern army with weapons plays a key role in supporting the battle readiness and fighting capacity of the troops. Because of chronic under-funding, armaments from the Ukrainian troops have barely been upgraded since the country became independent. On the other hand, large arsenals of weapons inherited from the Soviet Union that were designed to fulfill large-scale mobilization objectives are outdated and depreciated at the moment. This situation requires large-scale funding, specifically to reclaim outdated weapons and to upgrade arsenals of ammunition and military equipment and machinery.

The available reserves of military equipment and machinery in Ukraine surpass the needs of the Ukrainian Army by 20–120%. Given this, the State Program

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17 At the beginning of implementing the program of reforms in 2001, the Ukrainian troops numbered 416,000 servicemen.
for Supporting and Developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine provided for the decommissioning of outdated and disabled military equipment and machinery.\textsuperscript{18} Specifically, during the last five years, the country took out of service:

- 870 tanks;
- 380 armored military vehicles;
- 289 artillery systems;
- 299 military aircraft;
- 60 helicopters; and
- 28 ships.

As of late 2005, Ukraine reclaimed 56,300 surplus weapons, military equipment and machinery and 97,800 rockets and ammunition rounds. A presidential decree approved the State Program for Developing Armaments and Military Equipment and Machinery in Ukraine until 2015. However, the country has thus far failed to balance this program for upgrading the Army with its resource capacities to support it.

Special attention should be paid to the situation with the Armed Forces’ used weapons. Due to the exhausting of the operation life of the weapons, the majority needs to be replaced in the short term. Exceptionally complicated is the situation with those types of armaments that have a decided meaning in modern military conflicts:

- The majority of military aircraft and anti-aircraft rocket systems of the Air Forces will exhaust their operating resource within five years;
- More than 60% of anti-aircraft artillery has been in operation for more than 20 years; and
- In the next five–seven years, the majority of the Air Force’s rockets and launchers will exhaust their technical resources.

The upgrading of military equipment and machinery is one of the most important objectives of the country’s Armed Forces, according to Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Ukraine needs to begin planning allocations for this purpose now. Otherwise, “in one–two years, approximately 50% of military equipment and machinery will stop functioning and, in three–five years, the main component of the United Forces of Rapid Deployment will have 30%, or even 50% by specific indicators, of disabled equipment and machinery,” Hrytsenko said. This will deliver a serious blow to the military effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

Currently, Ukraine still owns some advanced military technologies and developments that could be used not only for exports, but also for the re-equipment

\textsuperscript{18} Equipment and machinery are taken out of service if their upgrade or repairs are economically inexpedient.
of the Ukrainian Army, provided the government implements a well-thought-out policy for armament production. Thus, for example, Ukraine has the chance to equip the Army with modern operational and technical rocket systems produced domestically. As of February 2006, the design office Pivdenne developed new drafts of the operational and tactical rocket system Hrom [Thunder] and the cruise missile Korshun [Kite]. Operational and tactical rocket systems are far cheaper than air forces, but they do not yield in the effectiveness in protecting airspace and land. Adding high-precision weapons to the arsenal was mentioned among the priority objectives of the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine. Nevertheless, due to scanty government allocations to purchase weapons, the domestic market of weapons of war is insignificant in Ukraine.

The new political emphasis on the Armed Forces in 2005

The coming of President Viktor Yushchenko to power in 2005 was a new landmark in nearly all government policy areas. In this context, Ukraine updated its defense policy.

The political events of late 2004–early 2005 helped a certain update of the emphasis in the policy of reforming the Armed Forces. Thus, the country adjusted the way program documents are prepared, the mechanism for formulating strategic goals and its priorities in developing the Armed Forces. In addition, priority steps included:

- The military political orientation of Ukraine towards accession to NATO;
- Reforms in the area of defense according to European standards;
- The transfer to staffing the top executive positions in the Ministry of Defense mainly with civilian personnel (as of today, this provision has nearly been completed);
- The reduction of the period of draft military service;
- The adjustment of the rate of reducing the numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces. Compared with the Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine until 2015, military personnel were reduced by 40,000 individuals according to the law on the numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2005 instead of the 75,000–85,000 individuals planned by the Bulletin;
- The reduction of the number of management units in the structure of the Ministry of Defense developed according to the new regulation. This makes it possible to raise the effectiveness of decision-making in and cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and General Headquarters;

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19 See Does Ukraine Need High-Precision Weapons of Control? by Valentyn Badrak, Politic Hall №25, February 2006.
The revision of the procedure for supporting the Armed Forces with mobilization resources in order to reduce the burden on the State Budget, specifically by:
- reducing the need for officers;
- ceasing to fund training of 6,000 students from the State Budget who study in military departments of civilian higher educational institutions according to the program for training officers in reserve; and
- revising a significant number of mobilization objectives;

The additional receipt of UAH 100mn by selling surplus weapons and military equipment and machinery and the allocation of this money for training troops;

The termination of a significant number of orders and contractual documents on transferring and selling military property as part of the steps to combat corruption; and

The full transition of the Armed Forces to a contractual system starting in 2010. This policy should help raise the professionalism and battle readiness of Ukrainian troops.

Since 2005, the Ministry of Defense decided to reject one-year defense planning and switch to a program-based method of strategic planning according to NATO standards. One of the documents in this area was the State Program for Developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006—2011. This program identified the main benchmarks for socio-economic development and the next stage of military reform in Ukraine. NATO experts provided assistance in developing this program. A special feature of this program is that, for the first time in the years since Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the Ministry of Defense identified input data for medium-term planning for military management bodies. This document was developed on the basis of evaluating real and potential threats to Ukraine’s national security and identifying the options for the likely development of conflict situations. Based on this analysis, the country identified objectives and the Armed Forces must be prepared to fulfill these objectives. The planning process was accompanied by a detailed description of objectives and options for the development of situations with planning resource support for the relevant actions. The main principles for fulfilling objectives were the multi-functional deployment of troops and specialized training for troops. Now, the main part of military subdivisions will be trained to fulfill several objectives and supported with relevant weapons and material supplies. As a result, the implementation of program-based strategic planning methods made it possible to:

- Effectively identify the structure and composition of the Armed Forces based on analysis of the options for the development of conflict situations and scenarios for the deployment of troops;
- Improve the system for training and to adjust it to the real conditions under which troops are deployed; and
• Reduce the government mobilization contract for weapons, military equipment and machinery, materials resources, human resources, etc.

**Structural descriptions of the Armed Forces**

The structure of the Armed Forces must be optimized in terms of fulfilling their objectives. Changes in objectives in the new geopolitical conditions, on one hand, and reductions in the numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces, on the other, require the simplification and optimization of military institutions in Ukraine.

The **organizational structure** of the Armed Forces was identified in the latest wording of the law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to the amendments to this law introduced in 2004, the structure of the Armed Forces includes:

- The General Headquarters;
- Armed Forces consisting of:
  - The Army;
  - The Air Force;
  - The Navy;
- Units, formations, military units, institutions and organizations that do not belong to the Armed Forces.

The functional division of the Armed Forces is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Functional division of the Armed Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational element of the Armed Forces</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Forces of Rapid Deployment</td>
<td>Immediate reaction to changes in the military strategic situation and neutralization of a low-intensity armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Defense Forces</td>
<td>Deployment in a medium-intensity armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Reserves</td>
<td>For the renewal and reinforcement of troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formations and military units that do not belong to military structures</td>
<td>Other service functions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces is determined by the relevant law that is passed by the Verkhovna Rada once every several years. In the past few years, Ukraine has been regularly reducing the numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces and disbanding military units. This has led to the disengagement of large volumes of military property that needed to be stored and further reclaimed. This then causes the need to maintain a large number of arsenals, bases and depots. As of today, the personnel in these storage facilities numbers 15,000 individuals, with 9,670 staff positions subject to reduction by late 2011. At the moment, radical reduction of the numbers of personnel in storage facilities...
is impossible due to the lack of technologies and capacities to reclaim surplus rockets and ammunition and the need to maintain a large number of personnel at these arsenals to ensure explosion and fire safety. According to estimates of the Ministry of Defense and the General Headquarters, it is impossible to further support the current reduction rate of the of personnel due to the above difficulties. As of late 2005, the Armed Forces consisted of 245,000 individuals, including 180,000 servicemen.

As part of reducing the number of personnel, the government plans to institute outsourcing in the Armed Forces. This step has the potential to reduce the number of positions in the Armed Forces by about 20,000. However, the transition to outsourcing will only be possible if the commitments to fund defense needs in 2007–2011 as part of the State Program for Developing the Armed Forces are fulfilled. At the same time, it has to be mentioned that defense expenditures planned in the 2007 State Budget are much lower than the Ministry of Defense’s budget inquiries.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are divided into the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

**The Army** takes first place in the Armed Forces in terms of the number of personnel and includes: mechanized, tank, air-mobile and rocket troops and artillery, military air force and anti-aircraft defense troops. As of late 2005, the number of Army personnel came in at 97,000 individuals, including 78,000 servicemen. They were completely furnished with weapons and military equipment and machinery and 70–75% furnished with material resources. At the same time, the depreciation and obsolescence of the majority of used weapons continues to be a serious problem. The organizational structure and combat composition of the Land Forces are presented in Appendix 2.1. Structural and numerical changes planned until the end of 2011 are presented in Appendix 2.2.

**The Air Force** was created by way of uniting the Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defense Troops, in May 2005. This process made it possible for the Armed Forces to switch to a modern three-type structure. The Air Forces of Ukraine consist of bombing, fighting, assault, reconnaissance, transport aircraft, anti-aircraft rockets and radio engineering troops. As of late 2005, the personnel numbers in the Air Forces constituted 59,000 individuals, including 50,000 servicemen. The state of the technical fleet of the Air Force is being upgraded very slowly, but is still unsatisfactory. The organizational structure and combat composition of the Air Force are presented in Appendix 2.3. The structural and numerical changes planned through 2011 are presented in Appendix 2.4.

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20 Explanatory note to the bill on the number of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2007–2011.

21 This refers to the transfer of protection and servicing functions to civilian structures.
The Navy consists of above-water forces, naval aircrafts, coastal rocket troops, coastguard troops and the marines. The organizational structure and combat composition of the Naval Forces are presented in Appendix 2.5. The structural and numerical changes planned through 2011 are presented in Appendix 2.6. The Navy is supported by main types of weapons and military equipment and machinery. However, three-fourths of these armaments are outdated.

As was mentioned above, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have three functional structures:

- United Forces of Rapid Deployment (UFRD);
- The Main Defense Forces; and
- The Strategic Reserves.

The United Forces of Rapid Deployment constitutes a cross-type operational formation of troops for immediate reaction to threats and armed conflicts in order to localize them and prevent them from escalating into war. The United Forces of Rapid Deployment consists of land, air and naval components. The United Forces of Rapid Deployment and 95% manned and furnished with armaments, but, as in the instance of other forces, outdated equipment and machinery and the under-funding of servicemen poses a problem.

The Main Defense Forces constitute the largest functional component of the Armed Forces. This multi-functional component is intended to reinforce the United Forces of Rapid Deployment in the instance of eliminating an armed conflict and also to repulse aggression in the instance of a large-scale armed conflict.

The Strategic Reserves fulfill the function of reinforcing the Main Defense Forces and can be deployed on the eve of or at the time of an armed conflict.

As a result of the lack of compliance between the functional division of the Armed Forces and new objectives and likely scenarios for deploying troops, the Ministry of Defense planned functional changes to this division. Specifically, the ministry plans to structurally separate units that differ by way of manning, arming and bringing troops into the state of battle readiness within the United Forces of Rapid Deployment and the Main Defense Forces. At the same time, the ministry plans to withdraw the Strategic Reserves from the composition of functional structures. The prospective functional structure of the Armed Forces by late 2011 is presented in Appendix 2.7.

At the time of transforming and building the functional structure, the ministry will place emphasis on developing the United Forces of Rapid Deployment. The United Forces of Rapid Deployment will be based on multi-functional air mobile and airborne troops with medium and light armaments. Such subdivisions will be
trained, primarily to participate in peace-keeping operations and anti-terrorism actions and eliminate the aftereffects of natural and humanly induced emergency situations.

Management of the Armed Forces

Raising the level of the cross-type troop management and compatibility of the managerial structures in the Ukrainian Army with the military management structures of NATO member states (the introduction of J-structures) became an important element in reforming the system for managing the Army in recent years.

The law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine determines that the Ministry of Defense is the “central executive body and central military management body and the Armed Forces are subordinated to the ministry.” Just as in many other countries, the president is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in Ukraine. By post, the minister of defense is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces if he is a serviceman. If the minister of defense is a civilian, then he is considered head of the Armed Forces’ General Headquarters.

In addition to the above institutions, military political management of the Armed Forces in Ukraine is the responsibility of:

- the Verkhovna Rada;
- the Cabinet of Ministers; and
- the National Security Council.

The current wording of the law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine establishes the following overall structure of the Armed Forces:

- The General Headquarters of the Armed Forces as the main military management body;
- The division of the Armed Forces into the Army, the Air Force and the Navy; and
- Units, formations, military units, military educational facilities, institutions and organizations that do not belong to any of the divisions of the Armed Forces.

The system for managing the Armed Forces has a five-stage structure:

- General Headquarters;
- The division of the Armed Forces;
- Operational command;
- Army corps/air command; and
- Formations/military units.
Currently, the operational management of the Armed Forces is not fully prepared for effective coordination of cross-type formations (groups) and peace-keeping contingents. This is why the State Program for 2006–2011 identified ways for accelerated improvement of the system for managing the Armed Forces. The program provides for shifting the emphasis on managing cross-type formations both on Ukrainian territory and in other regions across the world at the time of joint operations with troops of partner countries. This means a gradual transfer of the system of operational management from the five-stage system to the three-stage system, namely:

- General Headquarters;
- United Operational Command; and
- Cross-type groups, the army corps and air command.

In 2006, Ukraine began to form the United Operational Command. The country will form its first division, the Center of Current Operations, by the end of the year. Beginning in 2008, operational planning will be carried out by the United Operational Command, while the function of planning territorial defense will be the responsibility of the territorial departments set up on the basis of operational commands.

As part of bringing the organizational structure into compliance with NATO standards, the Office of the Ministry of Defense and General Headquarters of the Armed Forces fulfilled the requirements of the 1 March 2006 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution №232 on achieving the target ratio between civilian and military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, which currently stands at 76% to 24%.

In H1’06, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces and military management bodies began switching to J-structures and reforming its system of military registration and enlistment offices and setting up territorial manning centers and their branches.

The J-structure makes it possible to eliminate the surplus management units and to raise the level of responsibility among executive officers. To institute management on the basis of J-structures, the country is implementing a detailed plan of measures:

- Structural departments on humanitarian issues and social security of the Armed Forces are being introduced into the Main Personnel Department (J-1);
- Main Intelligence Department is being set up within General Headquarters (J-2);
- The activity of the Main Operational Department (J-3) is being focused on military strategic analysis, the preparation of proposals for strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and the identification of the principles for their training; and
The structure and numbers of personnel in the Main Defense Planning Department (J-5) is being improved by eliminating its atypical functions, such as supporting the activity of the tender committee under General Headquarters.

In addition, the Formation of Support Forces is set up on the basis of the Support Forces Command (J-4). In addition to structural changes, the General Headquarters is changing procedures for making decisions on deploying troops. Later, this procedure should address likely scenarios for the development of situations, with due consideration for both threats and the resource base.

The organizational structure of General Headquarters as of late 2005 is presented in Appendix 2.8. Structural changes planned through 2006 are presented in Appendix 2.9.
Defense and security expenditures

The legal field for funding defense expenditures

It is impossible to imagine an effective defense sector without the appropriate public funding of defense expenditures. The legislative base for funding the country’s defense sector consists of four laws:

1. The law on the State Budget of Ukraine annually determines the amount of funding for state programs in the area of defense (the defense budget) and secured State Budget expenditures and contains a list of benefits and exemptions for defense sector enterprises;
2. The 18 November 2004 law (№2198-IV) on the organization of defense planning that contains the description of the budget for defense planning;
3. The 5 October 2000 law (№2020-III) on the defense of Ukraine, which determines that the needs of the country’s national defense must be funded exclusively by the State Budget within the amounts annually identified by the State Budget law. The size of funding must provide for appropriate fulfillment of defense objectives.
4. The 22 October 1993 law (№3551-XII) on the status of war veterans and guarantees of their social security as amended, which identifies the legal status of war veterans, establishes the size of annual, one-time assistance for disabled veterans, participants in military operations, family members of the perished and spouses of deceased participants in military operations and disabled war veterans and provides a list of benefits and exemptions for war veterans and guarantees their social security.

Defense expenditures are included in programs of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industrial Policy, the Ministry of Emergencies and the Protection of the Population against the Aftereffects of the Chornobyl Disaster, the Main Intelligence Department under the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Council and the SBU, Ukraine’s national security service. The largest volumes of expenditures are funded by the Ministry of Defense (6.75% of total expenditures), the Ministry of Emergencies and the Protection of the Population against the Aftereffects of the Chornobyl Disaster (1.89%) and the SBU (1.36%).

Despite the sound legislative base for funding the defense sector, real defense expenditures continued to be inadequate for a long time in comparison to the size of the budget inquiries of the Ministry of Defense. In fact, under-funding of the sector became a permanent problem.
Problems

*Regular under-funding of the sector*

Since Ukraine became independent, reforms in the public sector, including in security and defense, were aimed at minimizing the Budget deficit by reducing public expenditures. The need to develop the country in the environment of an economic crisis resulted in the country not paying enough attention to defense problems, while funding for military programs was provided according to the residual principle. This situation made it impossible to implement comprehensive reforms in defense.

Thus, in the last reporting fiscal year (2005) alone, defense expenditures in the State Budget were planned at the level of actual fulfillment in 2004, despite the growing minimum wage and price and rate hikes. In addition, expenditures in 2005 were only 50% of the minimum need for funding identified by the Ministry of Defense, at UAH 7bn. The State Budget identified funding at UAH 5.9bn, while actual funding constituted UAH 6bn. The regular shortage of money makes it impossible to fund the main groups of expenditures, even at the minimum level.

Before that, in 2004, the country increased defense expenditures by UAH 900mn, a growth of 16.9%. Later, defense expenditures in the 2005 State Budget remained at the level actually needed to fulfill the 2004 Budget. However, because of growing nominal State Budget expenditures in 2003–2005, the share of State Budget expenditures on defense shrank from 9.4% in 2003 to 5.3% in 2005.

**Chart 1. Funding for the needs of the Armed Forces by year-end, billions UAH**
The law on defense in Ukraine determines that funding for the needs of the country’s national defense must be provided exclusively by the State Budget in the amount determined annually by the State Budget law, but at least at 3% of the estimated Gross Domestic Product. Regardless of this fact, defense expenditures constituted 1.6% of the GDP on the average during the last four years.

### Table 2. Defense expenditures in Ukraine in 2002–2005, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Average in 2002–2005</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The share of defense expenditures in State Budget expenditures</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense expenditures as a percentage of the GDP</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Real funding of the Army was significantly lower than the amount identified in the State Budget. In 2005 alone, the defense budget went slightly over (102%). As a whole, the amount of funding for this sector is compatible with the planned indicators, while funding for the maintenance and use of defense and military machinery and equipment was more than 50% lower than planned indicators.

### Chart 2. The structure of defense expenditures funded by the State Budget in 2003–2005, billions UAH

Source: State Treasury

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When analyzing the structure of defense expenditures (Chart 2) funded by the State Budget in 2003–2005, it is clear that the dynamic of changes in the structure of expenditures is not proportional. Specifically, the amount of expenditures on civil defense changed constantly (from 23% in 2003 to 15% in 2004 and to 12% in 2005). At the same time, the volume of funding for R&D in defense continues to be extremely low.

The presidential decree on the 25 November 2005 National Security Council Decision on the 2006 draft State Budget by items related to providing funding for national security and defense made the government responsible for guaranteed funding of the Army within UAH 8.9bn, regardless of revenues from selling surplus assets. In addition, this decree provided for instituting common standards for insuring the lives of servicemen for all law enforcement structures. However, this decision was not taken into account. As a result, the government submitted a draft State Budget of different contents to the Verkhovna Rada for consideration.

In addition, the monthly schedule for allocations of Budget funds to the Army, which was produced by the Ministry of Finance, does not allow for the implementation of targeted programs such as the housing construction program, works to repair and upgrade weapons, scientific research and the development of new equipment and machinery samples. The Budget provides for transferring 40% of funds in the fourth quarter. For this reason, money is not being used or is used with violations (included in debts). This entails the punishment of the Accounting Chamber.23

In 2006, the Army will not receive funds from selling military assets (approximately UAH 2bn). For example, it was planned to obtain UAH 840mn from selling military camps, but privatization slowed down due to the failure to regulate legislation. Overall, it is very difficult to fulfill the algorithm formed for filling the defense budget through the special fund in practice. The State Property Fund did not transfer privatization revenues to the defense budget. As a result, the Army will not be able to implement such programs as purchasing Oplot (Stronghold) tanks and creating the national corvette.24

Specialists say that Ukraine is returning to an eat-away budget for the army. Thus, in 2007, 68.5% of total military expenditures is planned to maintain the Army. With due consideration for traditional under-funding, this figure will grow at least 10%.25 The Ukrainian government proposes to reinforce fighting efficiency


25 For reference: up to 25% of funds are provided for training troops in global practice.
within 11.8% of expenditures, given that this figure runs the risk of shrinking to 7.5–8.5% if the trends in funding the Army persist throughout the current year. Finally, if developed economies invest up to 30% into developing new systems of weapons and purchasing new military equipment and machinery, Ukraine will make do with the planned 12.8%. As experience shows, funding usually shrinks 50% in practice.26

**Defense funding does not meet global standards: expenditures on re-armament**

The structure of State Budget expenditures on defense does comply with the practice of foreign countries. In developed economies such as the US, the UK and Germany, up to 32% of funds in the defense budget are spent on R&D. Funding of R&D in Ukraine accounts for only 1% of the defense budget.27 NATO’s main requirement for member states is that they spend no less than 2.2–2.5% of the GDP on defense.

The size of funding for developing armaments in Ukraine seriously differs from the amounts allocated to defense in NATO member states. If the share of defense expenditures as a percentage of the GDP is close to the requirements for joining NATO (the requirement is 2% of the GDP), the share of expenditures on purchasing defense and military equipment and machinery is far lower.

As the lion’s share of defense expenditures is channeled into wages and other operational expenditures, such items as purchasing, developing and maintaining weapons and military equipment and machinery are funded according to the residual principle. Despite a policy of reducing the numbers of personnel, the large share of expenditures on wages is explained by the excessive numbers of servicemen.

The low share of capital expenditures (5.8%) demonstrates the lack of funds to finance fixed assets and capital repairs of buildings. Thus, funds are practically not allocated for reproduction, renovation and reforms.

The decommissioning of outdated weapons and military equipment and machinery would make it possible to balance the budget of the Ministry of Defense and to channel funding into R&D, purchases of hi-tech weapons and military equipment and machinery. Reclamation of conventional ammunition that is not suited for further storage and use is one of the ministry’s main problems. However, to implement this measure, the country allocated only UAH 19mn (0.02% of State Budget expenditures or 0.4% of Defense Ministry expenditures), despite the fact that approximately 68,000 units of defense and

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26 Ibid.

military equipment and machinery are subject to decommissioning and that this figure will grow to 160,000 units by 2010. In addition, the Armed Forces have more than 2mn rockets and ammunition at 184 storage facilities. Subject to decommissioning are 550,000, including 70,000 that need to be decommissioned immediately due to the expiry of their storage period.28

Chart 3. **Defense expenditures and expenditures on defense and military equipment in NATO member states in Central Europe and Ukraine in 2004, %**

Launching the project of the NATO Trust Fund in February 2005 as part of the Partnership for Peace Program could become an instrument for resolving this problem. Ukraine and NATO have agreed on a program for decommissioning surplus ammunition, light weapons and shooting weapons and mobile anti-aircraft rocket systems. This project is being implemented by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

As part of the reclamation project, NAMSA is providing funds for purchasing new special equipment needed to carry out the demilitarization processes by holding an open and transparent tender among domestic companies.

Budget-funded programs barely provided for steps to upgrade defense and military equipment and machinery. As part of Ministry of Defense expenditures in 2004, it was planned to allocate UAH 38mn to upgrade T-64M Bulat tanks, which accounted for 0.05% of State Budget expenditures and 0.7% of Ministry of Defense Expenditures. At the same time, the depreciation of basic production assets reached a critical limit (more than 50% overall in the defense and industrial

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28 *The Military Doctrine of Ukraine and the White Paper of Ukraine are Program Documents for Reforming the Armed Forces* by V. V. Leonov and V. M. Markelov // Strategic Panorama, 2004, №4, p. 97 (in Ukrainian).
complex and 60–70% in specific sectors) because more than 80% of the defense and military equipment and machinery of the Armed Forces has been in operation for more than 20 years. Inadequate funding for reforms in the Armed Forces only allows for the implementation of the most expensive measures related to the disbanding, restructuring and relocating of military subdivisions.

The Air Force is in an especially difficult situation with armaments: air units report that only 60% of battle aircraft and 16% of helicopters are in working condition, while more than 50% of anti-aircraft rocket systems and 60% of battleships and boats need repairs. The Navy is furnished mainly with disabled ships and boats that need dock repairs. Almost 70–80% of the main assortment of rocket and artillery armaments will be unfit for use in battles by late 2005.

To clarify the role and participation of the domestic defense and industrial complex in providing for the needs of the Armed Forces, it makes sense to compare the overall weapons output of enterprises engaged in the armaments industry with weapons exports. In superpower countries, state defense contracts constitute the major part of defense and military equipment and machinery samples output, which contributes to an even and guaranteed workload for companies engaged in the armaments industry. In Ukraine, state defense contracts constitute only 3–5% of the total output of defense and industrial enterprises. Analysts say the use of outdated technologies and equipment makes it impossible to manufacture products competitive on the global market.

The lack of Budget-funded programs providing incentives for developing innovative potential

Ukraine is witnessing a decline today in the volumes of science-intensive civilian and defense productions. Fundamental and applied scientific studies are funded as part of National Security Council programs.

Funding for fundamental studies was reduced to UAH 0.88mn in 2005 compared to 2004, while funding for applied studies dropped almost 50% (down to UAH 3.3mn). In addition, the volumes of funding for studies are approximately 10 times lower than the minimum needs, while funding for works to develop new and prospective special technologies ranges within 3–5% of total R&D expenditures, almost 5 times lower than the necessary amount.
**Inadequate funding for conversion programs in the defense sector**

On the average, 50–70% of defense companies in Ukraine are subject to conversion compared to only 5–6% in developed economies. Under these circumstances, the problem of conversion has become one of the central problems for the entire government policy in Ukraine.

However, expenditures on the program for converting former military objects as part of expenditures of the National Coordination Center for the Adaptation of Servicemen Dismissed into Reserve or Discharged constituted only UAH 620,334 or 0.00078% of State Budget expenditures. In 2005, funding for conversion was increased to UAH 4mn and transferred into the competence of the Ministry of Defense.

**The lack of mechanisms to provide incentives for exporting defense and military equipment and machinery**

According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Ukraine places sixth among countries supplying main types of conventional weapons.

**Chart 4. Ukrainian exports of defense and military equipment and machinery, millions USD**

The main types of military and special products exported from Ukraine include aircraft equipment and related sub-systems, armored machinery, an anti-aircraft defense system, radar equipment, radio electronics, engineering and automotive equipment, products of military shipbuilding and ammunition.

If we compare exports of defense and military equipment and machinery in 2003–2004 that were at about USD 400mn to planned funds to purchase defense
and military equipment and machinery for the Ukrainian Armed Forces—UAH 56.7mn (USD 11mn) in 2004 and UAH 60mn (USD 11.5mn) in 2005, it is possible to see that the defense and industrial complex is almost fully export-oriented. The reason for this is the unsatisfactory funding of state defense programs.

Despite Ukraine’s certain achievements on the global market of defense and military equipment and machinery, there is a large number of complicated problems with developing the national weapons business, namely the inadequately high international image of Ukraine as a reliable exporter of defense and military equipment and machinery, brain-drain, outdated and depreciated unique equipment, the slower development of new samples of defense and military equipment and machinery, shrinking R&D expenditures, growing competition with Russia and new exporters of armaments of Eastern European countries, China, Egypt, Israel, Brazil, etc. that actively promote the relatively cheap military products that they manufacture. Also, Ukraine’s inability to purchase licenses to support the Army with modern weapons and to have a possibility to sell these products to third countries is a problem.

In recent years, one more area of exports has been services to repair and upgrade weapons and military equipment and machinery (at least one-third of military and technical cooperation). Ukraine has a well-branched repair infrastructure and there is high demand for these specific services.

Areas for reforming the defense sector

The government defense policy should focus on setting up an economically efficient structure that would not create an excessive burden on the national economy and would not hamper the country’s economic growth.

Analysis of the state of funding for defense from the State Budget identified the following main defense objectives of the state:

- The raising of the competitiveness of the defense and industrial complex sector by carrying out structural reforms and technological modernization;
- The increasing of the volumes of government defense contracts or developing long-term government programs to provide incentives for exporting defense and military equipment and machinery; and
- The ensuring of the further development of the sector by instituting innovation and investment models.

In our opinion, it makes sense to develop methods for evaluating the development of defense that must be based on identifying and justifying key structural indicators, analyzing the correlation between key indicators and their critical values identified by global experience and taking account of the dynamic of real defense needs and the ability of the country to finance them (see Table 3).
### Table 3. Components of the evaluation of defense sector development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of the methods</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Interpretation of indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Overall evaluation of defense expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| The ratio between defense expenditures and the main macroeconomic indicators | 1) Defense expenditures/ the country's GDP  
2) Defense expenditures/ State Budget expenditures | Shows whether defense expenditures meet international standards and standards established by the national legislation |
| **2. Evaluation of the structure of Budget funding** |                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                           |
| The structure of defense expenditures      | The correlation of funding for civilian and military defense and R&D in total funding volumes | Allows identifying priorities (or undesired defects) in government defense policy                                                                                                                                     |
| State Budget expenditures on defense       | 1) Funding for the defense sector/State Budget expenditures  
2) The rate of changes in defense expenditures/ the rate of changes in State Budget expenditures  
3) Funding for defense by types of Budget-financed programs  
4) The correlation of planned and actual indicators of funding for programs  
5) The share of capital expenditures, including expenditures to purchase defense and military equipment and machinery) in overall expenditures of the State Budget | Shows the level of funding for the defense sector as compared to other economic sectors, the dynamic of changes in funding for defense, the introduction and cancellation of special Budget-funded defense programs |
| Government programs to provide incentives for the development of this sector | The needs for funding/ actual funding for the sector | Shows the level of government policy effectiveness in funding government programs                                                                                                                                     |
| Benefits and exemptions provided by government bodies | The volume of tax exemptions | Shows the effectiveness of government policy to provide exemptions and benefits                                                                                                                                 |

Calculation of the proposed indicators must be the instrument for regular monitoring of the defense budget and inclusion of the results of analyzing the revealed negative trends in the annual process of developing strategic programs to develop the defense sector.
Restructuring of the Armed Forces

The main strategic goal of government policy in the area of reforming the Armed Forces is to balance expenditures on maintaining defense with economic resources and capacities of the country, to achieve the optimal structure and numbers of personnel in the Armed Forces and to carry out a large-scale conversion of the military infrastructure that is being disengaged.

Reforms in the defense and industrial complex

Government policy priorities in defense must be to restructure companies and organizations of the defense and industrial complex in order to raise export potential, create conditions for manufacturing competitive military and civilian products, optimize the numbers and funding of the Armed Forces, set up a system of dual contracts and to enliven research and development.

1. Setting up financial associations in the defense and industrial complex

It makes sense to set up a single concern\(^{32}\) or a corporation structured by types of troops in the Armed Forces. This concern can unite repair plants, R&D institutes and plants producing defense and military equipment and machinery. In the future, these concerns can be transformed into financial industrial groups, involving the banking sector and foreign capital as part of programs for cooperation between Ukraine and foreign countries.

Similar structures have already proved their effectiveness. Thus, for example, in Russia, the main principle of the Federal Targeted Program for reforming the Russian Defense and Industrial Complex was the integration of defense companies, power units and systems of final products into corporate holding structures.\(^{33}\) The operation of these structures made it possible to reduce the overall number of defense productions almost by 50%, minimize expenditures on developing and manufacturing products, simplify the system for managing defense enterprises and cooperate with participants in the technological cycle.

2. Integrating the defense and civilian sectors of the economy

In this context, it makes sense to provide incentives for disseminating dual technologies at the state level, which will make it possible to conclude military

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\(^{32}\) A concern integrates companies that preserve their independence and the status of a legal entity, but are strictly controlled by the parent company (the Ministry of Defense) that owns the controlling stake in the concern.

contracts with a broader base of enterprises on the basis of tenders. Orientation of scientific and technological potential in civilian and defense machine-building towards developing science-intensive hi-tech types of products, high-speed passenger transport and energy-saving equipment will make it possible to raise the efficiency of spending public funds. At the initial stage of converting defense enterprises, it makes sense either to provide partial Budget funding in the short term or to provide profit tax exemptions in order to support the level of profitability.

**Raising export potential**

Due to the export orientation of the Ukrainian defense complex, it makes sense to identify the geo-economic priorities on external armaments markets by selecting sales markets that are the most suitable for Ukraine.

**Conclusions**

Thus far, the balance of key indicators in Ukraine’s military and economic security has not changed for the better, the available funding for programs does not meet the military and economic needs of the defense sector and indicators of the state of the country’s military and economic security deviate from the standards established by the legislation and strategic plans.

The Strategic Defense Bulletin of Ukraine through 2015 (the White Paper) determines that the chosen course towards Euro-Atlantic integration and Ukraine’s intentions to actively participate in European security and defense policy result in the urgent need to accelerate reforms of the Armed Forces and other military formations. However, analysis of the real funding for defense expenditures shows that, the lack of funds in the State Budget does not allow for Budget-funded defense programs in full.

Ukraine is facing an extremely complicated objective—ensuring the economic growth and defensive capacity of the country. To implement full-fledged reforms in the defense sector, it makes sense to optimize Budget-funded defense programs and regularly improve defense planning.

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34 Dual technologies can be used to manufacture both defense and civilian products. The application of defense technologies in the civilian sector of the economy, as a rule, makes it possible to raise the technical level of production and to improve the quality of products.
Section 3

The NATO dimension
The evolution of the NATO–Ukraine relationship

General

NATO membership is a topic that prevails in almost all the disputes held in Ukraine. Simultaneously, much less attention is paid to the current condition of Ukraine–NATO relations. On the one hand, it may be a sign that Ukraine–NATO cooperation beyond the topic of membership is not that contradictory. On the other hand, it may reflect the lack of recognition of the level of cooperation that has already taken place. Such a situation complicates the NATO debate in some respects. Firstly, it means that Ukraine’s integration with NATO is regarded as even rather than a process in terms about possible membership in future. This is a regrettable misunderstanding indeed, for such an approach polarizes the discussion and forces people to formulate a strict position of pro or con as well as makes them feel reluctant to study a lot of issues relating to Ukraine–NATO cooperation. Secondly, it is doubtless that the general population’s attitude towards NATO is being built upon stereotypes and bias rather than facts or arguments (it is worthwhile noting this refers not only to membership opponents). Thirdly, a great number of analytical articles do not indicate the foundations they employ to build their arguments. In order to avoid this very trap this section provides a brief review of how Ukraine–NATO relations have developed in the last 10 years and also highlights the areas in which Ukraine currently cooperates with NATO.

A brief review of the Ukraine–NATO relationship from 1991 until H1’06

1992–1996

Considerable changes have taken place in the global security organizations since the moment of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Particularly, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization raised a doubt whether the preservation of NATO as a guarantor of security in the West was expedient. Since then, NATO has undergone serious transformations. In 1990, the London Declaration by the North-Atlantic Council’s heads and governments set course towards transformation. It was decided to ensure peace by supporting security and stability, common democratic values, human rights and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Two years after the London Declaration was made, Ukraine, having already gained its independence, started cooperating with NATO. On 10 March 1992
Ukraine acceded to the newly founded North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was eventually transformed to the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. Membership in NACC and later in EAPC provided an opportunity for Ukraine to partake in regular consultations on all security matters in the European-Atlantic environment. NACC was an important mechanism of coordination between NATO and former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, as well as newly independent states founded after the USSR’s collapse. NACC’s success was ensured by the voluntary participation of member countries in its initiatives. From the start Ukraine, being an active member of NACC (and then EAPC), focused its attention on the following directions:

- political and security issues;
- consultations on political planning;
- economic issues (the conversion of military production, including social dimension, security aspects in economic development, defense expenditures and defense budget);
- science; and
- peacekeeping operations, etc.

During the Brussels summit in March 1994, NATO launched the new “Partnership for Peace” program (PfP) within the framework of EAPC. Twenty-six countries accepted invitations to join to the program, including Ukraine, which was the first among CIS countries to do so. The program set forth the goal of strengthening security and stability in Europe and included a broad range of measures starting with military cooperation and ending with the regulation of crisis situations, armaments cooperation and control over air transport.

PfP’s founding document fixed NATO’s obligation to hold consultations with each of its active partners in case its territorial integrity, political independence and security were directly threatened. Each PfP’s member state had to pick out a number of measures enclosed in the Work Plan for European-Atlantic Partnership that it regarded as appropriate based on its own interests and priorities. Self-determination became a crucial principle of the PfP program.

Ukraine developed a general cooperation program within the framework of PfP. The Ukrainian side showed interest in cooperation in the military, military and technical and military and political spheres, as well as in science, ecology, defense economy issues, etc. Generally PfP directs its efforts towards the improvement of member states’ opportunities to jointly participate in international peacekeeping activity under the aegis of NATO.

1997—2001

The signing of a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in Madrid in July 1997 became a significant new stage of the Ukraine—NATO bilateral relationship. The
Charter defined the following main cooperation mechanisms of Ukraine–NATO cooperation:35

- Ukraine–NATO Commission (UNC) was set up as a working consultations body. The UNC passes, among other things, Ukraine–NATO annual target action plans and meets in the “26+1” format at the level of:
  - Ambassadors (Ukraine is represented by the head of the Ukraine’s mission to NATO);
  - Foreign affairs ministers; and
  - Defense ministers.
- The Ukraine–NATO Military Committee (MK) as a working consultations body for military issues only. MK meets in the “26+1” format at the level of:
  - Heads of general staff;
  - Military representatives (Ukraine is represented by a military representative from its mission to NATO).
- A Joint Ukraine–NATO Military Reform Working Group was founded to carry out provisions of the charter on a distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine. The group is a mechanism set up for conducting consultations between Ukraine and NATO in the “26+1” format and functions on a regular basis.
- The Joint Ukraine–NATO Working Group on Armaments is subordinate to the UNC and the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD).
- National coordinators from Ukraine–NATO cooperation are special representatives of the ministries and other Ukrainian central executive bodies to enhance cooperation with NATO in correspondent areas.

2002–2004

In May 2002, then-President Leonid Kuchma declared Ukraine’s goal of becoming a member of NATO. In July 2002, Kuchma had already signed a decree on the adoption of the strategy of Ukraine concerning NATO. The strategy was developed in order to ensure the course towards full-scale integration with European and Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Both the Action Plan and the Annual Target Plan for 2003 were approved during the Prague summit held in November 2002 at the Ukraine–NATO Commission meeting. The Ukraine–NATO Action Plan defined accurately Ukraine’s strategic goals and priorities to reach full integration with the Euro-Atlantic security organizations and established strategic frameworks for ongoing and future cooperation according to the charter on a distinctive partnership. Encouragement of democracy, market reforms, freedom of speech, political

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rights and other freedoms, the raising of economic standards etc. were the main elements of the plan regarding Ukraine.

In order to ensure reaching the goals and principles stipulated by the plan, the development of annual target plans (TP) that included Ukraine’s specific domestic steps and corresponding joint Ukraine—NATO measures was launched.

Mentioned among the Ukraine—NATO Action Plan’s goals was the development and introduction of a Memorandum of Mutual Understanding as to Ukraine’s backing of the alliance’s operations. Ensuring support to NATO operations included civil and military aid provided by Ukraine to allied forces and NATO organizations staying on its territory or passing through it in time of peace and war. This Memorandum was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in March 2004.36

2005—H1’06

In 2005 Viktor Yuschenko, Ukraine’s newly elected president, was invited to a NATO summit where the alliance’s leaders stated their straightforward readiness to deepen cooperation with Ukraine both within the framework of the current Ukraine—NATO Action Plan and relating to Ukraine’s acceding to the Membership Action Plan. The president expressed his preparedness to take real steps as far as acceding to MAP was concerned.

However, a project launched to help Ukraine utilize old cartridges, small arms and light ammunition depots proved that NATO related to Ukraine seriously. This action, EUR 25mn turned out to be the greatest of its kind, worldwide.

In April 2005, during a UNC meeting at the level of foreign affairs ministers in Vilnius, the NATO member countries and Ukraine launched intensified dialogue regarding Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO.37 The process of the intensified dialogue was aimed at getting specific information and experience as to candidate country’s rights and obligations and NATO’s obtaining of detailed information about the pace of reforms undertaken by the candidate country. The tasks within the framework of ID cover a broad range of political, military, financial and security issues connected with membership in NATO, but exclude any responsibilities as to any possible decision made by the alliance at any stage.

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37 Intensified dialogue is a shortened formulation of this format, which may be encountered in references. According to the existing rules, a candidate country begins work with the alliance through intensified dialogue (ID). Then it may receive an invitation to join the Membership Action Plan.
Along with intensified dialogue, the sides had planned a package of short-term actions for direct practical cooperation towards the support of reform priority goals. These actions focus on five major directions: strengthening democratic institutions, deepening political dialogue, intensifying security and defense reform, raising the level of people’s awareness and managing reform’s social and economic consequences.

Since the beginning of intensified dialogue, Ukraine–NATO cooperation has deepened. Presently, according to ID measures, Ukraine holds meetings within the framework of EAPC, regular meetings with the North-Atlantic Council at the level of ambassadors, with the NATO International Secretariat and with other NATO bodies, if needed.

Thus, on 20 February 2006 within intensified dialogue framework in Brussels, a deputy justice minister participated in a meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Political Committee. He informed committee’s members—representatives of NATO member countries—on the pace of legal and constitutional reform in Ukraine and the preparations for parliamentary elections. The deputy minister answered numerous questions from the alliance members’ representatives concerning various issues in the legal area.

During a meeting of the Ukraine–NATO Commission at the level of foreign affairs ministers on April 21, 2005 in Vilnius, an agreement between the Ukrainian foreign affairs minister and the NATO secretary general on Ukraine’s support to NATO’s anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean, Active Efforts, was concluded.

Ukraine’s Armed Forces participated in Operation Active Efforts (OAE) by:

- Functioning as an OAE contact point for element of information exchange within the operation based at the Ukrainian Armed Forces Naval Headquarters;

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38 After the terrorist acts on 11 September 2001 in the US, NATO enacted Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. At the United States’ request, the Alliance agreed to hold an antiterrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea called “Active Efforts” (OAE). Fighting terrorism by holding the operation in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent the illegal transit of weapons and ammunition by sea and counteract the illicit traffic of people and other unlawful activity with the use of civil vessels through patrolling and controlling ships’ navigation. Ukraine became the second non-NATO country member to join OAE after the Russian Federation. During an alliance summit in Istanbul in June 2004, the Ukrainian president declared Ukraine’s official consent to participate in OAE. The agreement took effect after being ratified by a corresponding presidential decree (№71/2006), coming into effect 26 January 2006.

The secondment of a Ukrainian signal-officer to the operation’s headquarters in Naples, Italy;
• Attracting a group of Ukrainian Armed Forces military personnel to participate in examining suspicious vessels; and
• Directing ships and subdivisions from the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Navy to become a part of the forces designated to participate in OAE.

On 28 April 2006 a meeting of foreign affairs ministers for the Ukraine–NATO Commission was held. During the closing press conference on its results, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that the sides had enjoyed a fruitful dialogue in a friendly atmosphere. Ukraine’s representative remarked that the meeting participants had positively evaluated the Ukraine–NATO Target Plan for 2006, as well as the results of work within the framework of intensified dialogue. The secretary general pointed out that NATO understood Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and emphasized that the alliance’s door was always open to democracies that met the necessary standards. He stressed a positive attitude within NATO on inviting Ukraine to join MAP.

**NATO—Ukraine cooperation in H2’06**

On 8 June 2006 another meeting of the Ukraine–NATO Commission at the level of Defense Ministers was held. During his speech, the Ukrainian defense minister informed NATO representatives of Ukraine’s current policy in the defense and security areas, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ lines of development and plans for Ukraine’s further participation in international peacekeeping operations.

Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko also presented his peers with an edition of the White Paper released in English entitled “The Defense Policy of Ukraine—2005”, which from then on was to be published annually.

NATO member countries’ representatives paid special attention to holding international military trainings on Ukrainian territory in 2006. The alliance representatives showed an understanding of the situation and confirmed their support of Ukraine’s course towards acceding to NATO and stated their readiness to provide any aid for the security and defense reform in future.

On 14 September 2006, during the Ukraine–NATO Commission meeting, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych confirmed Ukraine’s to continue close cooperation with the alliance. He also stressed the necessity to conduct an information campaign for the Ukrainian public to better educate it on the alliance, since the level of support for Ukraine’s acceding to NATO was extremely low. The NATO secretary general noted that both the Ukraine–NATO Action Plan and the intensified dialogue on membership and corresponding reforms had defined the common principles and goals in the political, economic, military, security and defense areas. He emphasized what had been already achieved, particularly
free and fair parliamentary elections, which proved that the Ukrainian people’s values coincided with the core values of NATO.

On 5 October 2006, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law allowing the use of Ukraine’s strategic transport aviation in NATO operations and trainings. According to the law, it is the government’s responsibility to decide whether it is politically and economically expedient to use transport aviation in the operations undertaken by the alliance. The law created a legal basis for NATO to use Ukrainian strategic transport aviation, which could ensure considerable in-payments to the State Budget for the exploitation of Ukrainian transport airplanes in NATO operations and trainings and further Ukraine–NATO cooperation.

The position of NATO leaders on Ukraine remains very liberal. NATO welcomes Ukraine’s intentions to deepen integration, including cooperation in numerous peacekeeping and other actions. Nevertheless, NATO’s concerns about Ukraine are due to the Ukraine public’s low level of support of Ukrainian NATO membership. NATO attributed this attitude to a lack of sufficient information about the alliance, as well as all the stereotypes that surround it, formed in the Cold War era. Ukraine is expected to hold an information campaign to aid the public in forming a more objective view of NATO.

According to NATO leaders, the three most significant achievements of the organization are:

- Assisting in ending the Cold War and uniting Europe through the defensive alliance;
- Securing freedom in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communist regimes;
- Transformation from an organization dealing with the protection of member states’ territorial integrity into an active union for resolving conflicts that contributes to international stability and security through the usage of the political and military resources of its member states.

NATO leaders maintain that every step Ukraine takes towards membership will not only contribute to the country’s military strength, but also add to its political and economic stability, decrease corruption and boost transparency.
Informing the public about integration into NATO

The problem: negative attitudes, uninformed opinions, stereotypical notions

The number of Ukrainians who support Euro-Atlantic integration has been shrinking ever since sociological surveys first began asking voters their opinion on Ukraine joining NATO in 2000. Further more, this trend has grown stronger during the time that the leaders of the Orange Revolution have been in power. At the beginning of 2005, directly after the revolution, the number of those who opposed membership in NATO rose sharply, including among those who had been neutral on the issue and those who had supported membership, reaching the 50% mark. At the beginning of 2006, the number of Ukrainians who opposed joining NATO grew another 14pp and currently includes nearly two-thirds of the adult population of Ukraine (64%), while the percentage of those who favor joining NATO is down to 13%.40

Moreover, the number of opponents of NATO overwhelms the number of supporters in nearly all regions of Ukraine, except for Halychyna, where 38% are in favor and 32% are against. Even among voters from Nasha Ukraina, the most consistent party on the issue of NATO membership, 40% are against and only 29% favor NATO membership for Ukraine. What can be said, then for the Party of the Region’s electorate, where 90% are against NATO membership and only 2% are for it?41

This growth in negative attitudes about Ukraine joining NATO is taking place among a population that is actually quite uninformed about the activities of the North-Atlantic alliance. According to one poll taken by the Democratic Initiatives Fund (DIF) in November 2005, only 1% of those surveyed could provide the correct answer to the question: “How many wars did NATO start”? The correct answer is one. About 88% of respondents answered the question “Did NATO initiate the current military operation in Iraq?” incorrectly or did not know at all, and only 12% answered correctly: NATO did not start the war in


Indicative of this are other results from sociological studies that show that only 6% of the population of Ukraine is properly informed about NATO and its current activities.

Table 4. Public opinion on Ukraine’s NATO accession, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mostly negative</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to answer</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly in favor</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin of error</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. If referendum on Ukraine’s NATO membership is held next Sunday, how would you vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wouldn’t vote</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to answer</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attitudes towards the alliance in Ukrainian society remain largely shaped by stereotypes from the Soviet era and tendentious judgments generally propagated through the Russian media. The last two domestic elections played a major role in worsening attitudes among voters on Ukraine joining NATO. A number of political forces launched a major anti-NATO and anti-American offensive in order to gain voter support. The culmination of this anti-NATO propaganda was a series of mass demonstrations in Feodosia over the holding of the Sea Breeze and Tight Knot international military exercises in Ukraine last summer. And although the exercises were not under the aegis of NATO and were about to take place for the 10th time in Ukraine, the general public linked them to government plans to integrate Ukraine into NATO.

During these protests, which had been initiated by radical pro-Russian parties and were supported by the then-Rada opposition and local governments in regions that were opposed to the Orange Administration, the administration that proved unable to persuade Ukrainian voters that its actions were absolutely justified and

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I. Kucheriv, Foreword, ibid., p. 5.


Public opinion poll by the Razumkov Center, held on 19–26 October 2006. The margin of error is 2.3%.
that the events taking place were nothing out of the ordinary? Because of this, much of the media, which also made little effort to understand the situation, published much contradictory and incorrect information, only increasing negative attitudes on NATO. In addition to showing how inept the government was at effectively keeping the people informed, the events in Feodosia showed the absolute lack of progress in carrying out a public awareness campaign on NATO among ordinary Ukrainians.

Efforts thus far: Why mistakes were made

Paradoxically, the public awareness campaign on Euro-Atlantic integration began in 2003 with the presidential decree approving the state program on informing voters of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration intentions for 2004—2007. It had been drafted by then-Chief-of-Staff Viktor Medvedchuk.45

In terms of being systematic and all-encompassing, the program is every bit as good as the public awareness campaigns of those countries that had already joined NATO. The measures in the state program can be loosely divided into five groups:

- **Information directly from executive bodies:** briefings, press conferences and web-sites, roundtables and public hearings.
- **Information in the media:** informational TV programs on the activities of NATO and its member countries, the current state of cooperation between Ukraine and the alliance and future prospects. A series of talk shows on popular channels dedicated to Euro-Atlantic integration issues (economic, cultural, social, defense, etc.).
- **Education:** courses in public and post-secondary schools, awareness-building for teachers and training for journalists. Competitions and an annual conference for young people in Crimea at Artek. An international camp in the Carpathians. Publication and dissemination of flyers.
- **Research:** setting up a NATO research center.
- **Ongoing monitoring of the level of public awareness:** continuous polling of public opinion and media monitoring.

The program encompasses 35 kinds of activities involving Derzhkominform, the ministries of foreign affairs, transport and communication, justice, defense and youth, family and sport, the National Academy of Science, the Council of Ministers of Crimea and oblast and local state administrations. To implement the program, plans were made for technical assistance and to involve community

45 The State Program to Inform Voters on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration for 2004—2007 (Presidential Decree №1433/2003 of 13 December 2003). During the 2006 VR election campaign, Viktor Medvedchuk was one of the leaders of “Ne TAK!” which undertook a heavily anti-NATO campaign and began collecting signatures to hold a referendum on the issue of NATO membership.
organizations. The Cabinet of Ministers was made responsible for coordinating program activities and overseeing their implementation.

Improving public awareness of NATO is also one of the priorities of the Ukraine—NATO Action Plan. The Annual Target Plans that form part of the Action Plan anticipate a slew of measures to implement this priority, including the kinds of measures laid out in the state program for 2004—2007.

In addition to those measures, the 2006 Target Plan contains five different kinds of events, such as improving the Ukraine—NATO portal. Of course, it is not clear what portal is meant. The only site that offers more-or-less complete information about cooperation between Ukraine and NATO is that belonging to the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration, at http://www.nceai.gov.ua.

This year’s Target Plan actually calls for “ensuring the review and approval of the National Euro-Atlantic Integration Informational Strategy and providing the human and financial resources to carry it out,” something that was supposed to be done during the first six months of 2006. A draft of such a strategy was prepared by NGOs back in 2005, but it has received no official nod to date.46

Aside from improving understanding of and support among Ukrainians for the country’s aspirations to become a member of the alliance, the non-governmental draft from the National Informational Strategy declares “setting up a system of two-way communication to establish contact, disseminate information and study public opinion” an important goal.

Despite a detailed description of the system of measures to keep the public informed, the state program has remained completely invisible to the average citizen. The previous regime obviously saw no political reason to carry it out. The Orange government has run into the problem that institutional capacity and skills are lacking to carry out public awareness campaigns in a democratic manner, where the press is free and privately owned. Clearly, there is no single entity that might answer for the coordination of the measures and ensure their fruition. Among the political reasons for the ineffective information campaign, experts say the government is afraid to openly promote an unpopular policy among voters.47

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46 The National Euro-Atlantic Integration Informational Strategy was drafted during a two-day working session organized by the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine, 13–14 June 2005. A slew of top Ukrainian NGOs that deal with NATO issues took part in the process. The roundtable was organized by the Ukraine—NATO Civic League, the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, the Foreign Ministry, and the NIDC. For more on the roundtable and the text of the strategy, see http://kyiv.osp-ua.info/index.php?newsid=8852 (in Ukrainian).

47 The main comments are from 69 experts polled by the Democratic Initiatives Fund at the end of 2005 and published in “Ukraine’s Place in NATO,” ibid., p. 24.
The public awareness campaign also lacks the necessary Budget allocation. In the 2006 Budget, state spending on a NATO integration campaign was pegged at UAH 5.2mn, while in the 2007 draft Budget this amount was cut to UAH 3mn. By comparison, Slovenia, which has a GDP one-third the size of Ukraine’s, spent USD 7.5mn on a similar campaign in 2001.

In addition, the state program does not take into account the particular nature of the flow of information in a democratic political system where there is free and privately owned media, plurality of opinion and open political competition. Clearly, when the state program was being drafted, no one paid attention to studies that showed why ordinary Ukrainians are so negative about NATO or how opinions differed by age, social status and region. As a result, this program does not reflect the need for different approaches to different population groups in any informational campaign and the presence of fixed, stereotypical ideas, nor does it account for the fact that this campaign would be taking place in a fairly hostile environment, where Russian media have considerable influence over Ukrainian news. This means that a Ukrainian audience needs to be presented with very high quality informational and analytical materials that would both be interesting and evoke trust.

According to Oleksandr Rudenko, an analyst at the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration, the state informational campaign contains many other flaws, such as irrelevance and lack of creativity. The irrelevance arises from the strictly “pro forma” attitude of government administrators towards organizing such activities, while lack of imagination means that the public awareness efforts of both government offices and community organizations do little to get the relevant groups of the population interested in this information. A particular problem is the fact that geopolitical issues interest ordinary Ukrainians very little, in comparison to the question of their financial standing.\(^48\)

**What should a public awareness campaign on Ukraine’s membership in NATO look like?**

In a book published this year by DIF called “Ukraine’s Place in NATO. A survey of experts,” the authors gathered the opinions of experts about what a public awareness campaign on the issue of NATO membership should look like. The respondents said that a substantial campaign needs to touch on at least six topics:

- **Objective Information about the NATO:** Focusing on NATO standards, which are based on democratic values such as respect for the individual, for the nation and for human rights. Pointing out the interconnectedness of

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\(^48\) From the presentation of Rudenko, information and communication manager at the NCEI. Transcript of the presentation of survey results and the DIF book, “Ukraine’s Place in NATO,” Kyiv, 5 June 2006.
Europe, NATO and these values should make it easier for people to accept the path to NATO as a path to the best defense of their own interests at a normal, worthy level.

- **NATO’s newest member countries**: Showing that there were no significant negative consequences and pointing to the many positive ones.

- **Ukraine–NATO issues**: Focusing on NATO’s practical programs in Ukraine, such as re-training military personnel, cleaning up after flooding in Zakarpattia, destroying anti-personnel mines and outdated weapons, etc.

- **The reasons and priorities for joining**: Moving arguments in favor of Ukraine’s membership in NATO from abstract formulations to specific advantages for every individual and every family. Not everybody understands why there might be a threat from the side of Russia, but why we need to reform the army is something that even those who have very little notion about the Ukrainian army understand.

- **An analysis of reservations**: Without hiding the financial and military problems connected with joining NATO, focusing on the long-term gains involved.

- **Ukraine’s future in NATO**: Explaining what, how, and with what money Ukraine will serve in a transformed Alliance.\(^{49}\)

The experts noted that funding will mostly have to come out of Ukrainian pockets and not only from the public coffers. “Business and representatives of various media empires...also need to show some civic awareness. The state needs to either force or persuade them to contribute to this task. The campaigns should be run by both NATO and NATO-funded NGOs,” one expert said.\(^{50}\)

The experts surveyed also proposed “studying the nature of those views, conceptions and stereotypes that remain in the public consciousness and developing and proposing new stereotypes and new, that is, constructive, ideological notions.” Community organizations need to be part of this campaign.

Experts disagreed, however, on how the information should be presented. Those who consider joining NATO a fairly long-term prospect see the campaign as strictly informational and believe that what is needed is not propaganda, but education and not persuasion, but information so that every person can decide for themselves. In their opinion, open propaganda will repulse people.

Those who favor joining NATO in the near future see the campaign as one of more advocacy and promotion. Supporters of an active campaign note that just informing people is not enough, but that something has to be done to interest the majority of Ukrainians.\(^{51}\)

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 25–27.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p 27.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 28.
However, the basic principles for running such a campaign are the same, regardless of the proposed nature of the influence: openness, debate, justification, objectivity and non-intrusion. The experts also noted that there need to be measures that are specific to each target group, an individualized approach with concrete arguments.52

**Will a broad-based public campaign be enough for Ukraine?**

*No, we need dialogue at the highest levels*

There’s no doubt that Ukrainians need unbiased information about NATO. But, in the first place, an informational campaign such as the one proposed in the state program to inform the public of European and Euro-Atlantic integration will not yield the expected results. Its primary flaw is that it largely proposes that the state-initiated campaign on NATO and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration reach the public through special communication efforts by government offices, through media materials commissioned by the government and through state institutions such as schools and universities.

Yet in a situation where, as polls have shown, the public believes in persistent stereotypes and their confidence in government institutions is low, this kind of campaign will be perceived as biased state propaganda and will not evoke trust. This is especially true given the level of trust among opponents of integration—mostly the Party of the Regions’ electorate—in those who are likely to take the lead in such a campaign, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk and Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko.

A classic public awareness campaign might be effective if the undecided were dominant among the general population and if those against NATO could offer rational, objective arguments rather than defining their position on the basis of stereotypes or politically-motivated false arguments. Counterarguments have little

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52 The authors of “Ukraine’s Place in NATO” designated a list of the key target groups based on the expert opinions polled:

- “sophisticated” people;
- those who remain undecided on NATO;
- those who support joining NATO “with reservations”;
- the elite (decision-makers especially need to be convinced and certain);
- young people (they are the least “infected” by old stereotypes and are more interested in taking advantage of NATO membership);
- that part of the intellectual elite that is most in contact with the general population (teachers, doctors);
- military personnel;
- business owners;
- school-children (the Baltic countries discovered that when children were involved in the issue, they were able to engage 3–5 adults); and
- residents of Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Target groups with whom it makes little sense to work (opponents of joining NATO) include:

- pensioners; and
- people with a Soviet mentality.
effect in this kind of situation and most of those who oppose Ukraine’s membership in NATO consider the alliance an “aggressive military bloc.”

Secondly, NATO is simply the answer to a question that has never been clearly placed before politicians who represent different social groups. The question of NATO is so aggravating in Ukrainian society because, in their struggle for power, political forces have always been interested in confusing problems and solutions in voters’ heads, hindering a clear analysis before making the necessary decision. Talk about NATO has always been about a decision without having first focused on the problem: What happens to Ukraine if it does not belong to any defensive bloc, if it fails to modernize the Armed Forces, etc.?

In other words, before promoting a decision of any kind, public opinion first has to reflect an awareness of the problems facing Ukraine. If most Ukrainians are able to understand the gist of the challenges that Ukraine is running into in the defense and security spheres, it will be easier for them to make a conscious decision about the best solutions.

Thus, before starting a public awareness campaign, a responsible government should initiate a public dialogue in which it names the problems that it believes can be answered through membership in NATO and invite politicians and voters to begin to discuss them. Ukrainians need to first be aware of the threats to national security and how the security service and army might respond to them in order to independently formulate an answer to questions such as: What kind of security system does the country need? How can national security be ensured? Why should Ukraine integrate into NATO or into any other collective security system?

The problem is that national security and defense issues are fairly remote to the average citizen—and quite abstract. Most people simply don’t feel the effect of these in their daily lives. That means the debate needs to start at the level of politicians who represent different interests in Ukrainian society and whom Ukrainian society has empowered to deal with national problems.

After all, at the level of experts, there is no question about whether Ukraine needs NATO. The 69 experts surveyed by the Democratic Initiatives Fund were unanimous in stating that Ukraine should be in NATO.

Why, then, do politicians have such extremely different views? Because they are not answering the question of Ukraine’s security and the government is not putting this question urgently to the country’s main political parties. At the state level, there is still no National Security Strategy in Ukraine that would, in contrast to the law on the basis of national security, clearly define sources of threats to the country’s security, meaning the question of Ukraine’s membership in NATO as a matter of state policy has become a political issue—one of those that “split” the country.
Appendices
## Appendix 1

Conference agenda “Intensified Ukraine–NATO Cooperation: Challenges and Benefits of Accession to the Membership Action Plan”

*13 October 2006, 9:30–16:00*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30–10:00</td>
<td>Registration of participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–10:10</td>
<td>Opening addresses: <strong>Viktor Chumak</strong>, Director, International Centre for Policy Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:10–10:20</td>
<td><strong>James Greene</strong>, Head, NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Ukraine</td>
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**Session 1: Identifying national security and key threats to it. How can cooperation with NATO help eliminate these threats?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:20–12:00</td>
<td>Introductory speech: <strong>Anatoliy Hrytsenko</strong>, Ukrainian Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issues for discussion:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A strategic view of the situation and the nature of threats to national security (<strong>Volodymyr Horbulin</strong>, Head of the National Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The correlation between serious and insignificant threats to the country’s national security (<strong>Borys Parakhonskiy</strong>, Vice-President, Center for International Security and Strategic Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ukrainian allies, partners and potential adversaries (<strong>Mykola Sungurovskiy</strong>, Acting Director, Military Programs, The Ukrainian Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00–12:20</td>
<td>Coffee break</td>
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**Session 2: What security sectors should Ukraine develop? How can the MAP help here?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:20–13:30</td>
<td>Introductory speech: <strong>Viktor Chumak</strong>, Director, ICPS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issues for discussion:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The concept of a security sector (<strong>Anatoliy Kinakh</strong>, Chair, The Verkhovna Rada Security and Defense Committee)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Civil democratic control of the security sector (Duncan Hiscock, Security and Defense Expert, ICPS)

• Spending on security in the context of reforming this sector, reducing troop strength and the operating costs of existing missions (Valentyn Badrak, Director, Ukrainian Center for Military, Conversion and Disarmament Studies)

13:30–14:30 Lunch

Session 3: Guaranteeing a successful NATO public awareness campaign

14:30–15:55 Introductory speech: Michel Duray, Director, The NATO Information and Documentation Center in Kyiv

Issues for discussion:

• Why previous public awareness campaigns failed (Anatoly Murakhovsky, First Deputy Head, State Committee on Broadcasting)

• Successful public awareness campaigns among new NATO member states (Dr. Septimiu Caceu, Project Director, The European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC), Romania; Martins Murnieks, Secretary General, Latvian Transatlantic Organization (LATO)

• Consultations and information: How should the Ukrainian government use public policy tools to increase public support for its policy towards NATO? (Serhiy Dzherdzh, Deputy Chair, The Coordination Council, The Ukraine–NATO Civil League; Dmytro Shulha, European Program Coordinator, The International Renaissance Foundation)

15:55–16:00 Wrap-up

Closing address: Viktor Chumak, Director, ICPS
Appendix 2.1
Organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Army, end of 2005

Appendices

Strength:
- Personnel – 97,000
- Tanks – 732
- Armored combat vehicles – 1,713
- Combat helicopters – 106
- Artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm – 1,298


Appendices
Appendix 2.2
Perspective organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Army, as of late 2011


Strength:
- Personnel – 60,000
- Tanks – 488
- Armored combat vehicles – 2,013
- Combat helicopters – 76
- Artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm – 1,274
Appendix 2.3

Organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Air Force, end of 2005

Strength:
- Personnel: 59,000
- Combat aircrafts: 204
- Transport aircrafts: 32

Appendix 2.4

Perspective organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Air Force, end of 2011

Appendix 2.5

Organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Navy, end of 2005


Strength:
- Personnel – 20,000
- Anti-submarine aircrafts – 4
- Artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm – 66
- Combat ships – 15
- Tanks – 39
- Anti-submarine helicopters – 4
- Armoured combat vehicles – 171

Diversified forces squadron
Naval base
Naval aviation brigade
Detached coastguard brigade
Directly attached units

Appendix 2.6
Perspective organizational structure and operational strength of Ukrainian Navy, end of 2011


Strength:
- Personnel — 11,000
- Anti-submarine aircrafts — 4
- Artillery systems with a caliber of more than 100 mm — 66
- Combat ships — 15
- Tanks — 39
- Anti-submarine helicopters — 10
- Armoured combat vehicles — 91
Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
(up to 29,000, or 30% of operational strength)

Formations and military units, organizations and agencies that are not part of functional structures
(up to 49,000)

Main Defense Forces
(up to 65,000, or 70% of the Armed Forces’ operational strength)

Immediate Reaction Force
(up to 6,000)
Designated for immediate reaction to threats, containment, deliberate prevention and neutralization of armed conflicts at their initial stage.

Rapid Reaction Force
(up to 23,000)
Designated for strengthening the immediate reaction force, the creation of a JRRF group to adequately react to threats, and in case of real armed conflict—to prevent its development into a local war.

Military Enhancement Force
(up to 20,000)
Designated for enhancing efforts; strengthening JRRF (when needed) while carrying out tasks to liquidate (localize) armed conflicts.

Stabilization Force
(up to 45,000)
Designated for deploying formations and military units, needed to ensure the task fulfillment by JRRF and Military Enhancement Force; fit to be used in all possible forms of military operations, during liquidation of armed conflicts and for situation stabilization.

Appendix 2.8
Structure of the General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, end of 2005

Head of General Staff—Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces

- Apparatus of assistants to the Head of General Staff
- Financial Department
- Department for legal groundwork

First Deputy Head of the General Staff
- Central Department of Communications and Information Systems
- Central Department for Protecting Information and Cryptology
- Administrative Office
- Central Command Center
- Deputy Head of the General Staff—Commander of General Staff’s Supporting Forces—Commander of Supporting Forces

Deputy Head of the General Staff
- Central Personnel Department
- Central Operational Department
- Central Department of Defense Planning
- Military Science Division

Deputy Head of the General Staff
- Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration
- Department of Verification
- Central Department for Humanitarian Issues and Social Protection
- Department of Military Cooperation

Deputy Head of the General Staff
- Department of Troops Service
- Military Heraldic Service
- Military Musical Department
- Fire Safety Department
- Department of Physical Training
- Administrative Service Office

Supporting Forces Command

Central Department of the Military Service for Law and Order

are maintained beyond the General Staff’s full complement

Appendix 2.9

Perspective structure of the General Staff of Ukrainian Armed Forces, end of 2006

Appendix 3

Sources used


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