What next, after the election?

As in 2006, five parties won seats in this election: the Party of the Regions, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, the Nasha Ukraina–Narodna Samooborona bloc, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the Lytvyn Bloc. The Socialist Party of Ukraine failed to make it into the new legislature, having lost more than half of its electorate since the 2006 election because it did not uphold its campaign promise regarding the formation of a coalition. On the other hand, a party that lost in the 2006 election managed to gain seats this time: the Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc.

The three top parties, PR, BYT and NU-NS, together took 80% of the vote and all improved their share since last year. This was the result of support that they gained from voters who cast their ballots for small parties that failed to muster 3% in 2006.  But the winner in the vote-building contest was undoubtedly BYT, which had a majority of the vote in 16 out of 25 regions, plus the capital. Although it was in second place in the end, this result will allow BYT to put together a majority together with the pro-presidential NU-NS, which came in third.

The Orange camp can now put together a coalition

Based on the results at this time, BYT and NU-NS can put together a coalition without even including other partners. With only 228 seats in the Rada, however, ICPS analysts say that this will not be enough to ensure that the coalition can work steadily. Most likely it will need to invite a third party to join, which could be the Lytvyn bloc, with its 20 seats. In such a situation, the coalition will have 248 votes.

Still, including the Lytvyn Bloc carries a number of risks as well as benefits. For one thing, the two main parties will have to give up their previous agreement to split Government and other posts right down the middle, something that is actually written into the latest agreement between BYT and NU-NS. For another, there are doubts about where the loyalties of the Lytvyn Bloc lie.

ICPS analysts still consider it unlikely that a broad coalition will be established between Nasha Ukraina–Narodna Samooborona and the Party of the Regions immediately after the election. NU-NS will not be a stable coalition party for PR. Moreover, both part of the NU-NS bloc itself, such as Ukrainiska Pravnytsia, Narodna Samooborona and parts of the Nasha Ukraina party have completely distanced themselves from such an option. It follows that, for the President himself, such a coalition would have the effect of undermining support in the Rada: he would find himself opposed by both BYT and part of his own faction. Moreover, a coalition between NU-NS and PR would still not guarantee the President support from PR for his initiatives in the Rada.

The formation of a broad coalition will also reduce support for the President among Orange voters. The chances that Viktor Yushchenko will make it into the presidential run-off in 2009 will grow even worse. And finally, a coalition with the Party of the Regions is no guarantee that PR will not nominate its own candidate in the 2009 race.

This means that the most likely coalition immediately after this election will be an Orange one, with BYT and NU-NS, which is what the pro-presidential electorate expects. Some changes in this coalition will be possible only in the medium term, if a change in the political situation provides the main players room for political maneuvering.

The possibility of another political crisis remains

The formation of an Orange coalition should, in the short term, ease some of the antagonism in relations between the President and Premier that was characteristic under the recent Yanukovych Government. Still, for an end to be made to this crisis, the newly formed coalition will have to engage first of all in entrenching institutions that can guarantee that politicians play by the rules from now on. This firstly means reforming the Constitutional Court and the judiciary. Secondly, it means bringing the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers in line with the Constitution, adopting the Regulation for the Cabinet of Ministers as a Bill of Law, and amending the Budget Code. The Cabinet also needs to return the President’s Constitutional rights, which have been taken from him in this Law. In addition, it’s extremely important to regulate relations within the Rada itself, as well as to give the opposition proper powers by either passing a separate law or adopting the Law on the Verkhovna Rada Regulation.

These measures lay the foundation for the Cabinet of Ministers and the President to act on the basis of a similar interpretation of the Constitution and for the legitimacy of any decisions they make to be beyond question. And this activity could become part of the new coalition’s agenda. Otherwise, say ICPS analysts, the impression that the crisis is over will be short-lived. Without institutional change, the crisis will not be healed.

The Orange forces don’t have a unified agenda regarding state policy and are not united by common political goals especially in terms of the 2009 Presidential election. Views on public administration, the goals of economic policy, and, more important, on who leads, differ in the Orange camp. Moreover, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko make no bones about their ambitions to run in the next Presidential race.

This means that, after the emotional euphoria of the joint victory settles down, the fierce competition within the coalition will continue—for the right to make strategic decisions and for leadership. The President will want the Government to carry out his agenda, and NU-NS supports him in this, while Yulia Tymoshenko will insist on her own goals. If democratic institutions are not strong enough, this cohabitation could end in the break-up of the coalition, and possibly even new elections. In any case, without democratic institutions, the weakness of the coalition will equate the weakness of the state.

Reforms will have to wait

The current situation does not bode well for reforms. A number of reasons explain this. Firstly, reforms cannot be undertaken because they simply have not been planned. Other than Constitutional reform and reform of the judiciary, no other reforms were under discussion during the election campaign. For instance, despite all the promises to increase pensions offered by all political parties across the board, not one party discussed the continuation of pension reform. In addition, none of the reforms of the branches of power can take place without an effective civil service. Its absence is the biggest problem of a democratic society facing Ukraine today. Yet every last party in Ukraine has kept mum about reforming public administration.

Secondly, the approach of a Presidential election means there is a relatively small window of opportunity for the Rada to undertake effective work. The election will take place in December 2009, but the campaign will effectively begin a year earlier. These are political realities that will remove any desire on the part of politicians to undertake reforms because the benefits are likely to be long-term, while voters will feel the impact of unpopular decisions almost immediately.

Thirdly, steady economic growth that looks set to continue for the next several years removes any economic incentive for a Government to undertake reforms.

The Government’s foreign policy will not change

The results of this election are unlikely to have much of an impact on Ukraine’s foreign policy. The coming to office of the Tymoshenko Government will not mean that Ukraine turns its back on Russia or swiftly becomes a member of NATO. Despite many demands from her partners in the future coalition, Ms. Tymoshenko did not ever outline her position on NATO during the campaign and is unlikely to make any radical changes to foreign policy, especially if this leads to serious confrontation in relations with Russia and sudden changes in the price of gas.

In future, a change of Government will have ever less impact on Ukraine’s foreign policy. In the past, the fierce confrontation between Russia and the West in political debate in Ukraine were driven by the fact that Ukraine was choosing not only its foreign policy vector, but also its model for internal development. With the democratization of its political system, this conflict between Russia and the West in Ukraine’s foreign policy has been removed. Today, there is consensus among all the country’s main parties about the need for Ukraine to integrate into the EU and to maintain good relations with its northern neighbor. The issue of NATO membership has become much more controversial, but every Government that makes this its goal has to deal with public opinion.

Author: Ivan Presniakov