After the economic whirlwind blasted Ukraine in autumn last year, the whispering of some foreign politicians, investors and newspapers grew ever louder through the depths of winter: Ukraine, they said, was heading for economic meltdown. By the beginning of this year, yields on the country’s debt were the highest in the world except only for Ecuador, which had already defaulted.

But Ukraine did not default. So why the panic? Ask analysts in Ukraine and abroad and you’ll hear one reason over and again – political risk. With the crisis raging, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were “at each other like dogs”, as Viktor Chernomyrdin, former Russia’s ambassador to Kyiv, put it. Unable to agree on a workable anti-crisis plan, they have pointed fingers, slung mud and worked at cross purposes.

In fall 2008, as the crisis hit, Yushchenko called parliamentary elections in an attempt to get rid of Tymoshenko, only to postpone the ballot as the situation deteriorated. He says her government has run up huge debts to finance the budget deficit; she says the National Bank, controlled by the president, is a den of corruption. She says the new gas contracts signed with Russia in January eliminate a corrupt intermediary connected with him; he says the contracts are a millstone around the country’s neck. And so on.

The Orange duo are by no means the only ones to blame. The main contribution of the opposition Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych, in the past year has been to constantly block parliament, paralyzing legislative work. Then there was his half-hearted attempt to bring “the people” onto the streets in spring, marching under banners reading “No to the crisis.” Constructive opposition this was not.

The International Monetary Fund has been the guiding hand for Ukraine, providing almost $11 billion in loans since last autumn in exchange for key reforms to help combat the crisis. But further cooperation is in doubt as Ukraine’s economy remains hostage to the political ambitions of the country’s leaders with the January presidential election approaching.

Tymoshenko has been unable, or unwilling, to push through gas price increases promised to the IMF; Yanukovych made a budget-busting increase in social spending his sole aim; Yushchenko at the end of October signed a law hiking the wages and pensions, despite IMF demands not to. Yanukovych and Yushchenko have caught Tymoshenko in a populist pincer movement by placing an even greater burden on budget resources that are already struggling, and threatening further IMF lending.

There could be light at the end of the tunnel. Ukraine’s democratic system means that Yushchenko is unlikely to be re-elected because of widespread disappointment at his failure to implement reforms.

That leaves Tymoshenko and Yanukovych as the leading contenders. By steering the country away from the edge of the cliff and pushing through sufficient reforms to keep an exasperated but lenient IMF onboard despite the political paralysis, the current prime minister has shown herself an able crisis manager. Her team is promising a year of deep and comprehensive reforms if she wins the elections, although the proof, of course, will be in the pudding.

Yanukovych has as yet said little on his program, beyond uniting “power and the people” and putting an end to what he called the “chaos, lawlessness and economic ruin” brought about by the quarrelling leaders.

Whatever the outcome of the election, it won’t be the magic pill. Ukraine’s constitutional mess, which leaves an unclear division of power between president and prime minister, together with the deep-rooted political rivalries, will continue to wedge the door on reforms shut. But a new president could provide the impetus to force it open.