Foreign Policy

Nuclear disarmament: Ukrainian-Korean lessons

Ukraine and North Korea which are so different and distant were connected within the context of nuclear non-proliferation. There was a time when Ukraine made a significant contribution to strengthening this regime by nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, North Korea consistently undermines this regime by demonstrating to the whole world by its own example, the opportunities and risks of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In recent weeks, given the rhetoric of nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula following the summit of the leaders of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, the parallels have become too obsessive; and the question of whose choice will eventually turn out to be the right one is a matter of interest to many. According to the conditions of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 which has been so often mentioned in the last years, Ukraine has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, thus getting rid of the nuclear arsenal that remained on its territory after the collapse of the USSR. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were not the pioneers on this complicated and controversial path: several years ago, the South African republic rejected the nuclear weapons. Unlike the post-Soviet republics, South Africa fully controlled its small nuclear arsenal - for this reason it could be considered a model for future nuclear disarmament cases. Current nuclear states are primarily interested in increasing the number of such cases, but the paradox is that they are often seen as a source of threats pushing other states to obtain nuclear weapons. In case of Ukraine this paradox transformed four years ago from an intellectual puzzle to a key issue of foreign policy. The strategic challenges faced by the leadership of the DPRK today differ significantly from those that the leaders of the Ukrainian state tried to resolve a quarter of a century ago. The international environment and the international security situation are fundamentally different. Thus, such cases are more interesting to compare. Could Ukraine get the best, in words of Donald Trump, deal? And will North Korea follow the example South Africa? What are the starting points for a serious talk about nuclear disarmament in the modern world as a whole? In the early 1990's, optimism and faith in the future without conflicts prevailed worldwide. Against this backdrop, nuclear weapons seemed not to be the relic of the past, with which it is impossible to solve the challenges of the future: to accelerate economic development, to change the social model, or to build an effective democracy. Membership in NATO seemed rather reachable, moving towards Europe simple, and the neighborhood with Russia good. Rejecting nuclear weapons was much easier twenty five years ago: the deal seemed to be to exchange of unnecessary military resources for such necessary legitimacy, Western support and money. North Korea makes its decisions in other circumstances. The period of romantic perception of international security has past long ago, and events in Ukraine have considerably deepened the crisis of world order. The demand for hard power has suddenly emerged again, and nuclear weapon is considered by many as a "great counterpart" in the military capabilities of the various potential states. It seems that Ukrainian experience has been useful for many, including the DPRK. Its key lesson is that exchanging nuclear weapons is reasonable only if reliable security assurances are provided. A number of states which were technologically capable of creating nuclear weapons, from Australia to Japan, and from Sweden to South Korea used to go that way. The fact is that for the United States, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a priority of the foreign policy strategy since the 1940s. Sanctions and preventive military strikes appeared to be less effective instruments than the proliferation of security assurances: and over the past 70 years, US security commitments have been expanded exponentially, in both multilateral formats, such as NATO or ANZUS, and in bilateral agreements concluded with Japan or South Korea. Nearly always the motive behind such commitments is the desire of the United States to prevent their allies from gaining nuclear capability. Ukraine in its time did not learn this lesson. Nuclear weapons should not be exchanged for money or for any other non-security related resources. Indeed, Ukraine did not control nuclear weapons on its own territory and it weakened its position in negotiations with Washington. However, it didn’t mean that Ukraine could not demand more. In 1994, this could be a security treaty with the United States, which including an obligation to protect Ukraine, which is not provided in the Budapest memorandum. Today, in a crisis of international security and lack of trust, such an agreement is not enough.

ICPS Press
04.05.2018
Internal Policy

ICPS will start accepting applications for participation in the project "Integration of Internally Displaced Persons into local communities. Workshop program in Germany"

The International Center for Policy Studies, in cooperation with Cultural Vistas (Germany) and with the support of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is launching a project to support Ukrainian activists and experts involved in the integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in local communities in Ukraine. To this end, 13 participants from different regions of Ukraine selected on a competitive basis will attend a six-day training course in Berlin where they will have the opportunity to improve skills of promoting the integration of IDP into local communities. Since 2015, Germany has been actively testing various initiatives to improve the integration of migrants, many of which are based on cooperation with local or regional organizations and the commitment of individuals to help migrants to adapt to new environments. At the same time, Germany faced a wave of negative perception, which caused many misunderstandings and cultural stereotypes. To minimize the effects of such trends, civil society representatives have been actively involved in Germany to support "newcomers to society", regardless of their native region of origin, political preferences, religion, etc. In order to exchange experience on this issue, ICPS initiates a training program for Ukrainian colleagues. Participants will be able to get acquainted with the experience of German colleagues in overcoming the perceptions, stereotypes, misunderstandings, and to develop their own decisions to improve the integration of IDP taking into account the Ukrainian context. In addition, the curriculum provides for the study of the German reunification model of 1990-1991 and the implementation of decisions aimed at bringing together two socio-political cultures (East and West Germany) of that time. Duration of studies in Germany: September 24-29, 2018 Upon returning to their communities in Ukraine, participants will have to organize events involving the IDP and representatives of host communities to discuss their experience and find ways to overcome the challenges faced by IDP in Ukraine. Language of training: English, German. Synchronous translation into Ukrainian is provided. Transportation costs as well as living expenses are covered by program sponsors. In order to participate in the project you need: - to be involved in the process of integration of the IDP in the local community; participate in projects aimed at improving the integration of the IDP; to be actively interested in and explore this issue; seek to improve the situation with the interaction of the IDP and host communities in Ukraine; - to speak English at the basic speaking level; - have a valid biometric passport. Otherwise - the participant will have to undergo the procedure for obtaining a German visa on his or her own; - send a resume and a motivational letter justifying your interest in the program and describing the relevant experience by e-mail office@icps.com.ua. Limitations on participation in the program: civil servants and representatives of local authorities cannot be participants of the project. Deadline for submitting applications is June 4, 2018 If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us: +38 044 253 52 29; +38 068 194 94 04.

ICPS Press
02.05.2018
Foreign Policy

Expert discussion: “Anti-Russian sanctions: the instrument of influence or demonstration of weakness”

On April 25, the International Center for Policy Studies held an expert discussion on "Anti-Russian sanctions: an instrument of influence or demonstration of weakness?" The regime of sanctions has been implemented for four years, and the preservation or expansion of its scope has become a peculiar criterion for the success of foreign policy in general. How valid is this criterion? What can be achieved through sanctions and what is the best way of their application? «Sanctions can help prevent further violations and the use of violence – here there are more chances of success. And this is exactly what worked in the sanctions of the West against Russia. From my point of view, the main role played by Western sanctions is precisely the suspension of further Russian aggression, "said ICPS expert Mykola Kapitonenko. "Sanctions are an instrument, part of a strategy aimed at achieving priority goals. "And sanctions are the instrument that has its own price and fairly limited effectiveness which leads to creating complex dilemmas over time because it has rather  controversial consequences," he said. As a rule, sanctions are imposed to influence a country that violates agreed norms, international principles with a view to changing its behavior. They are relatively frequent: among 26 sanction programs currently conducted by the United States 12 were initiated over the past 10 years; the United Nations has imposed sanctions more than 20 times since the end of the Cold War, however before only twice. Today in the vast majority of cases there are imposed the so-called "targeted" sanctions as opposed to comprehensive sanctions, which were much more popular until the 20th century. The key difference between them is to differentiate between those responsible for implementing a particular policy of groups or individuals from the rest of the population, the expert said. According to ICPS research, statistics of recent decades indicate that only in one of every fourth case, economic sanctions have led to significant changes in the behavior of the state against which it was imposed. The highest effectiveness of sanctions - about 50% - is observed in the case of destabilization of the political regime. But in such a case there are significant reservations: external factors can become a factor in consolidating society around the ruling power. Meanwhile, according to Kapitonenko, the sanction policy of the West is now not aimed at changing the regime in Russia. Speaking about the recommendations on the application of sanctions against Ukraine by Russia, the expert emphasized the importance of maintaining meaningful dialogue with the partner states: the more profound is the understanding of the interests and controversial assessments / positions of the partners regarding anti-Russian sanctions, the more productive and prolonged cooperation will be in this direction. It is important to create a hierarchy of goals that need to be realistic, taking into account the potential and the limit of the effectiveness of sanction policy. Alongside this, restrictive measures against the Russian Federation should be expanded, as long as the emphasis be made on target sanctions, in particular personal, he said. In addition, asymmetry in relations between Ukraine and Russia should be taken into account, because, according to the expert, in this case Ukraine is a weak and vulnerable party that essentially distinguishes Ukrainian anti-Russian sanctions from the West. Also, economic sanctions should have a transparent procedure and control over their implementation in order not to become an instrument of internal political struggle with competitors, "Kapitonenko noted. The International Center for Policy Studies has prepared recommendations on the strategy for applying sanctions: Supporting a more meaningful dialogue with partner countries. The more profound the understanding of their interests and contradictory assessments / positions regarding anti-Russian sanctions is, the more productive and lasting will be cooperation in this direction; Create a hierarchy of goals. The sanction strategy - like any other - cannot be effective without identifying the primary goals. They need to be realistic, taking into account the potential and limit of the effectiveness of sanction policies; Determination of optimal characteristics of the sanction regime; An important and effective instrument is the combination of sanctions with threats of subsequent sanctions, as well as with other instruments of pressure; A more in-depth study of a multilateral format of anti-Russian sanctions is needed. On the one hand, the common stance of as many countries as possible concerning the issue of anti-Russian sanctions makes their use not so expensive or risky for each of them individually; Asymmetry in relations between Ukraine and Russia must be taken into account; Sanctions should be state policy instrument followed by clear and understandable application of logic and transparent rules. Transforming them into a means of combating competitors will discredit not only Ukrainian sanctions against Russia, but also undermine the effectiveness and credibility of sanctions in general; The use of sanctions – the complex and sometimes contradictory instrument with due regard to the asymmetry of Ukrainian-Russian relations is rather expensive. Therefore, it should be an element of two strategies: the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the determination of the format of bilateral relations with Russia.

ICPS Press
25.04.2018
Economic Analysis

Energy interests and economic security of Ukraine

The decision of Germany and other EU countries to permit the construction of the “North Stream-2” gas pipeline again raised the issue of the future of Ukraine's gas transportation system and energy security of the country as a whole. Despite certain tactical achievements (reducing the volume of Russian gas consumption, the acceptable for “Naftogaz” decision of the Stockholm arbitration, etc.), the question of a strategy for achieving the energy security in general remains one of the most important challenges for Ukraine's national interests. At the same time, the government announced plans for achieving energy independence of Ukraine in 2020 and its sustainable development in 2035, however the way towards remains blurred. In addition, the implementation of Russian alternative gas pipeline projects may leave Ukraine at the edge of such an important element of economic activity as gas transit, leading to significant financial and political losses. Main figures and trends In 2017, “Gazprom” increased its exports of gas to Europe by 8.1%, reaching 193.6 billion cubic meters. In total, EU consumption in 2017 is estimated at 560.5 billion cubic meters of gas. Thus, “Gazprom's” market share in Europe has reached 34.7%. At the same time, Germany remained its largest market, while having imported 53.4 billion cubic meters of gas. Ukraine's GTS in 2017 provided 44% of Russian gas supplies to the EU. The transit of gas through Ukraine last year amounted up to 93 billion cubic meters. Compared to the volumes of 2016, transit has increased by 13.7%. This allowed Ukraine to earn nearly $ 3 billion due to the transit of Russian gas. Given that the country's GDP in 2017 was equal to $ 110 billion, this amount has made up to 2.7% of its volume. At the same time, in mid-January 2018, “Gazprom” received permission from Turkey for the construction of the second line of the "Turkish Stream" gas pipeline. Later, on March 26, Germany allowed to construct the “Nord Stream-2” in the Baltic Sea. The Russian gas monopolist has also made concessions to change the gas prices for the markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Such actions can have a positive impact on the European Commission's decision to address “Gazprom's” antitrust legislation in the European markets, which is expected in late April. These facts indicate that, despite complicated political relations, the EU Member States' own interests in the sphere of economic cooperation and, especially, energy, remain crucial. The construction of new gas pipelines, alternative to the Ukrainian GTS, can marginalize Ukraine's role in the issue of gas transit, transforming such a strategic national resource as a gas transportation system into a scrap in the future. In order to avoid the implementation of such a scenario, fast and effective actions are needed to preserve the role and place of the Ukrainian gas pipeline in the transit of gas from Russia to European countries. Consequences of Russian gas streams “North Stream-2” and “Turkish Stream” projects envisage the launch of a gas pipeline with a total throughput of about 85 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Given the recent data on transit through the Ukrainian GTS, the launch of the above-mentioned streams can take away nearly 90% of Ukrainian transit or nearly $ 2.7 billion in revenue per year. Main gas pipelines from the Russian Federation to Europe TITLE OF THE GAS TRANSPORT SYSTEM STATUS CAPACITY “Ukrainian GTS” Functioning 288 billion cubic meters per year 142,5 billion cubic meters per year (near EU border) “Yamal – Europe” Functioning 32,9 billion cubic meters per year “Nord Stream” Functioning 55 billion cubic meters per year “North Stream 2” Project The launch is planned in 2019-2020 55 billion cubic meters per year “Turkish Stream” Project The launch is planned in 2019-2020 31,5 billion cubic meters per year “South Stream” Project Frozen 63 billion cubic meters per year Source: Information from public sources Approximately the same figures are announced by “Naftogaz”, which estimates the financial losses at $ 3-3.5 billion dollars from the launch of alternative gas pipelines by Russia and from the complete stop of the Ukrainian GTS. In addition, the term of the current contract with “Gazprom” on the gas transit expires in 2019. According to the head of the Russian company, Alexei Miller, “Gazprom” can provide transit through Ukraine in the amount of 10-15 billion cubic meters per year, which is up to 10% of its capacity and less than 20% of the current volume of transit. For that, according to the head of the Russian monopolist, Ukraine must justify the "economic feasibility" of a new transit contract. In turn, the Ukrainian side announced that its main goal would be to preserve the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine after the expiration of the contract with “Gazprom”. However, it has not informed yet in what volumes and how it is planned to be reached. Nevertheless, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has already said that it is looking for a company to manage the Ukrainian gas transportation system. It also presented the idea that Ukraine would be able to further operate the gas transportation system by importing or transiting gas from Romania, however it is unlikely that the Romanian transit would be able to replace the vacuum created due to the redirection of the current transit flows. Additional aspects of energy relations In addition to the gloomy prospects in relations with the Russian Federation on gas transit and while taking into the account the blockade of the Donbas, Ukraine has to solve the issue of own energy supply and the reduction of its import dependence. This is confirmed by the fact that in 2017 Ukraine significantly increased the volume of imports of natural gas, coal and petroleum products. Moreover, Slovakia, Belarus and Russia were the main energy resource supply countries in 2016-2017.                                                                  Main energy resources: import, export, transit   Import, 2017 Change in imports to the previous year Export, 2017 Change in exports to the previous year Transit, 2017 Change in transit to the previous year Natural gas 14,6 billion cubic meters +49% - - 93 billion cubic meters +13,7% Coal 19,777 million tons + 26,4% $105,5 million +200% - - Petroleum products 9,7 million tons +11% 0,8 million tons +100% 16,4 million tons +1% Nuclear fuel $533,4 million -2,9% - - - - Electricity 0,05 billion kW per year -38% 5,2 billion kW per year +37% 1,4 billion kW per year +218% Source: According to the data of Energy Customs and State Fiscal Service On the other hand, the development of the renewable energy sector is positive for Ukraine. In particular, according to the State Department of Energy Efficiency, its total launched capacity reached 121 MW in 2016 and 257 MW in 2017. At the same time, only during the 1st quarter of 2018 Ukraine launched nearly 159.4 MW of renewable energy. In general, since 2015 more than 550 million euro has been invested in "green energy" and the total capacity of renewable energy entities is now equal to 1.5 GW. At the same time, in the near future, renewable energy will not replace the traditional energy sources, and only the implementation of real market conditions in the energy sector while promoting investments, increasing own gas production and strengthening the energy-saving technologies, will allow the country to approach the minimum acceptable standards of energy security. The ways of balancing the energy interests The nearest tasks for the Ukrainian government in the energy sector include: liberalization and opening the energy markets; preservation of the transit infrastructure of the state, restoration of confidence of external partners and financial organizations in the reliability of Ukraine as a transit country; well-balanced tariff policy for the transit of energy resources and domestic energy consumption; the fulfillment of requirements of the Third Energy Package, namely the separation of the “Naftogaz” activities for the transportation and distribution of natural gas; "Energy Euro-integration", synchronization of the energy systems with the European market (ENTSO-E, ENTSOG); diversification of sources of the energy resources; decreasing the energy consumption for own production, increasing the energy efficiency of the country; growth of Ukrainian energy resources production; stimulating the alternative renewable energy. In the near future, Ukraine has to settle the issues of “Gazprom's” supply of 2 billion 427 million cubic meters of gas to the occupied Donbass area and the $ 1.3 billion invoice. In addition, the decision result of the Court of appeals in the County of Svea (Sweden) on the dispute between “Naftogaz” and “Gazprom” about $ 2.5 billion of fines due to the Stockholm arbitration is being expected. The solution of the above-mentioned issues will eliminate the possible risks of Ukraine's energy and economic security. Otherwise, Ukraine risks losing a significant share of transit, which will result in the further increase in tariffs for the population and in the disruptions in functioning of its GTS. However, even under these circumstances, there is a hope that the growing demand in the European market and the interests of “Gazprom” to constantly increase its market presence there (as evidenced by data - its market share reached only 26% in 2012) may partly save Ukraine from the total loss of the GTS. Thus, the chess game on the energy interests of all interested parties has not finished yet. The fact that “Gazprom” will not be able to completely stop the transit of gas through the Ukrainian territory plays in favor of Ukraine. This is supported by the growing demand for gas in Europe, by the load of gas pipelines branches, by the relative loyalty of neighbors and by the favorable infrastructure of the Ukrainian GTS. However, it is not possible to win due to only these factors. Therefore, in order to ensure the transit of gas after 2019 in the amount not less than 40 billion cubic meters per year (minimum economically profitable volume) and to attract investments in modernizing the Ukrainian GTS, the government should not continue the only rhetoric of confrontation and should not feed the illusion of independence, but it should take the concrete steps, negotiate with all parties and propose alternatives to achieve long-term goals rather than short-term benefits. Otherwise, the levers of influence can finally disappear and economic security together with the energy interests will be once again solved at the expense of the Ukrainian population.

ICPS Press
23.04.2018
Foreign Policy

Decade after Bucharest Summit: Has Ukraine become closer to NATO?

Ten years ago, when the world was completely different, NATO adopted a Summit Declaration in Bucharest, where paragraph 23 referred to the postponement of the MAP for Ukraine. All the traditional protocol norms followed, and diplomatic formulas voiced. In Ukraine, which, as in the past, as now, covered by predilection passions, the news caused a mixed reaction. Someone upset, considering the security vacuum to be an invitation to Russian influence. Someone liked — the reputation of NATO in Ukraine was not so brilliant as it is today. Politicians, in its turn, were thinking of how to play a NATO card in the elections that were once again promised to be fateful. Today, Ukraine again wants to enter NATO speaks about the MAP and is preparing for the elections again. Some mistakes of a decade ago will be made again. However, the conditions for repeating those mistakes are much more rigid. Is Ukraine closer to NATO today than it was ten years ago?  Probably not. Because when we are running to NATO, we are moving away from it, there are three main reasons: international, Ukrainian and Russian. Correct mark of the weight of each of them will help to avoid simplifications, disappointments and false decisions. International factors that complicate Ukraine's move to NATO are out of our control, have a long-term impact and are not a subject to rapid change. In 2008, the life of the aspirant country (as it is now fashionable to call) was compare simple and easy: to do a “homework” – it means, turn the country into a true democracy; and make sure the key member states of NATO, that you will bring more benefits than troubles. International security, particularly in Europe, was comparatively strong: frozen conflicts such as Transnistria were one of the most serious problems. Russia's politics was not entirely understandable, but predictable. Institutes and security mechanisms in Europe were still working. A few months after Bucharest Summit, the situation changed with the developments of the Russian-Georgian war in August. There is a widespread thought that Russia's aggression against Georgia, as well as later against Ukraine, was a consequence of the failure to provide the MAP to both countries in Bucharest. The question is how reasonable this opinion can be. The MAP does not extend to the country in which it provides, the Alliance's security guarantees, and in the case of aggression, it remains alone. Would Russia's aggression be accelerated, delayed or blocked by another solution in Bucharest is a speculative issue. We did not manage the simple tasks for aspirant of a decade ago – and this is the main reason for slowdown on the path to NATO, as it was and is now. Today, we repeat the mistakes of the past, believing that the more loud and hard we knock at the NATO door, the sooner it will be opened.   Ten years ago, they knocked through the “letter of three” – signed by the President Victor   Yushchenko, the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the Speaker Yatsenyuk, who had to prove the unity of Ukrainian politicians who were not usually favorable to her. Today they are knocking through changes to the legislation, both those that have already taken place and possible constitutional ones. Now there are also many talks about the referendum. Interestingly, the argument with a referendum will only work for the Russian audience. There is still a belief that NATO has been expanding against the will of the population of the new member states of Eastern Europe, to confirm exactly what they refer to without referendums. NATO is not argued by referendums. It is unlikely, that now anyone is in doubt that most Ukrainians would like to get under the protection of the Alliance and resolve all their problems in such an uncomplicated way. But NATO is not interested in the desire of Ukrainians, but they are concerned with common interests. A wide field of these common interests appears in cases where neighboring countries can become democratic and effective. Democracy for NATO is an operational code and a trust saver, not beautiful slogans. Unfortunately, for Ukraine, on the contrary. A warning that without a strong democracy and a rule of law, joining NATO will not happen – is rhetoric but pragmatic demands. In 2008, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Ukraine in the ranking of the Democracies of the World on the 53rd place in a group of Democracies with Disabilities. In 2017, we were – for the version of the same edition – on 83 place in the group of hybrid regimes. If more democracy means being closer to NATO, what does Ukraine's current position in the ranking of democratic states mean?      Of course, Russia's factor plays its part, and it does not play a role in Ukraine's prospects for NATO. Russia's aggression undermined our security, ruined regional security, undermining the credibility of institutions and states. We argue the Europeans of the seriousness of the Russian threat and for them, too, but they hardly see the solution to this problem through Ukraine's accession to NATO.  It is crucial for NATO to maintain unity and effectiveness, and this requires maintaining the Alliance's credibility. The hypothetical membership of Ukraine will, in case of Russia's further aggression, have too complex dilemmas in front of each member state. Although it is often believed that the Russian war in Ukraine pushes Kyiv to NATO, this is true only as far as public opinion concerned.  The existence of an open conflict and high probability of its escalation inhibits our movement to NATO, and to other possible coalitions, as it multiplies the number of risks associated with Ukraine.   Ten years ago on the desire of Ukraine to MAP played international stability strong support of Washington and a much better situation inside the country. Today it is possible to try to play on the public opinion of Ukrainians and the exploitation of the threat from Moscow. Passion of simple decisions makes the international situation of Ukraine more and more complex, and does not look like, that the prospects of NATO membership are an exception to this trend.  

ICPS Press
03.04.2018
Internal Policy

The Art of Tolerance: Blitz-Speeches on PeaceKeeping

The International Centre for Policy Studies, with the support of the United Nations Development Program in Ukraine, launched a "Reinventing Respect" communication campaign to support tolerance and mutual understanding in society a year ago. The main goal of the given project was to reduce the polarization of public opinion and strengthen dialogue among various social groups. Within the framework of the project the UNDP Ukraine Envoys for Tolerance and Promoting Tolerance and Mutual Understanding were chosen. In particular, in the form of a creative interview, Neil Walker - UN Resident Coordinator in Ukraine and Vadym Chernysh - Minister for Temporary Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons identified the need for a dialogue in society as a necessary basis in the context of situation in Ukraine. ICPS expert Mykola Kapitonenko and ICPS Chief Advisor Vasyl Filipchuk consider trust as the main building material for creating tolerant society. In turn, Igor Kozlovsky noted that love is the main thing. "Everything begins with love, and very often the reason of all the problems is that people do not know how to love," says a religious scholar. Mykola Kapitonenko also noticed that the perception of diversity and respect for everyone is a sign of the most successful society. A panel with Envoys was extremely interesting, moderated by Pavel Vyshebaba and Lyubko Deresh. The writer and human rights defender Larisa Denisenko emphasized that the first step is to determine their own latent intolerance. The artist Alevtina Kakhidze shared the experience of communicating with people during trip to the East. The creative part was presented by readings of poetry by the People's Artist of Ukraine Natalia Sumska and singer Katya Chilly. There were also awarded winners of the creative works competition with a view to promoting the ideas of tolerance among students and digital-specialists.

ICPS Press
22.03.2018